BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS SINCE 1936

by

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(A.B., Bryn Mawr College, 1943)
submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1947

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INTRODUCTION

Today, even more than in the days of the Trojan War and the quarrels between the Italian city states, the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are a danger to world peace. The Straits are important not only to the states bordering the Black Sea for whom, in most cases, their Black Sea ports are their only sea-outlets and to all nations who ship their products down the Danube, the Dnieper, the Don, or the Dniester Rivers into the Black Sea, but also to outside powers who ship their goods into the Black Sea from the Mediterranean.

With the growth of national states and large-scale power power politics, the control of the Straits acquired strategic importance. After the invention of mines and long-range artillery, it was comparatively easy for the country ruling Constantinople to control the Straits. Today, with airpower and more formidable weapons than ever before, it is questionable how effective such control of the Straits would be. However, no such test has yet taken place, and possession of the fortifications of the Straits is still coveted by interested powers, even though it may be obsolete in a military sense. Strategically, too, the Straits are no longer two separate problems, as they were in the time of the Greeks, but one, together with the islands of the Aegean Sea. The question of the control of the entrance into the Black Sea or exit to the Mediterranean Sea is part of a struggle going on between the "heartland" and the "periphery" states for political supremacy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and the routes to east and west centered there.

Today, even more than in the days of the Trojan War and the quarrels between the Italian city states, the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are a danger to world peace. The Straits are important not only to the states bordering the Black Sea for whom, in most cases, their Black Sea ports are their only sea-outlets and to all nations who ship their products down the Danube, the Dnieper, the Don, or the Dniester Rivers into the Black Sea, but also to outside powers who ship their goods into the Black Sea from the Mediterranean.

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The question of the Straits, as one of the issues which may lead to a third world war if not successfully dealt with, has become an international concern. It cannot be ignored as too minor for attention. The solution in itself will certainly not prevent war, but a peaceful compromise for one of the differences between the major powers might well lead toward others.

A study of the present regime of the Straits, how it came about, how it has and is functioning, its applicability to the future world situation, is necessary to understand just where the danger lies. This paper tries to present a comprehensive picture of the main issues since 1936 -- a brief historical survey points out the place of the Dardanelles in earlier struggles for power, the seeds of the present rivalry. The settlement after the first World War and its ultimate inappropriateness, while not a close parallel to the present situation, do show the dynamic state of a political balance of power. The Montreux Conference itself depicts the making of compromises, the intense feeling between interested powers, the type of dispute, the delicate balance between a successful and a discordant conference. The operation of the Montreux Convention during World War II and the real reasons for its successful function are also examined in detail. The growth of the new Soviet move to control the Straits, with its international repercussions, indicates the tension which now exists -- the outcome of which has not yet been determined.

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official or semi-official documents, but, in the more recent sections, newspapers and periodicals have been the source for both diplomatic correspondence and general public opinion. Finally, the conclusions which seem to follow from the facts have been presented, including possibilities for settlement of the issue their estimated chance of success.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND UP TO 1918

The question of the Straits has shown its twofold aspect, commercial and strategic, from the very beginning. The early Greeks collected tolls on passing merchant ships, and one of the important parts of their expansion was through the Straits to the shores of the Black Sea. When the Romans took over the control of the Straits, there was little concern over control for strategic purposes since Rome ruled the ancient world, but trade was still carried on through the Straits. When the political center of gravity moved to Constantinople, the more modern phase of Straits history began. Outside nations vied with each other and with the Greeks for trading privileges. The development of Italy and, with it of Europe as whole, is said to have been retarded for centuries by the struggle of jealous Mediterranean states to gain a monopoly of the markets and control of the Straits.

Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453, and the Straits became Turkish property. In 1475, with the capture of Azov and the Crimea, the Black Sea itself became a Turkish lake. It was the established policy of the Ottoman Government to exclude all foreign ships from the Black Sea by closing the Straits of the Bosphorus. A series of treaties between the Western Powers and the Ottoman Empire began in 1535 and, by the close of the eighteenth century, through capitulations, nearly all the Christian countries of Europe had gained recognition for the rights of their citizens engaged in business with the Turks. Although

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none of these treaties granted passage through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea, the merchants of Europe did find their way into the Black Sea, either by chartering Turkish shipping or merely by evading the restrictions.

At the end of the seventeenth century, Russia began to show an interest in the Black Sea trade. Peter the Great's demand for freedom of navigation on the Black Sea was refused by the Turks. Under Catherine the Great, Russia established her power along the Black Sea coast; the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji of 1774 permitted for the first time free and unimpeded navigation officially for merchant ships of Russia in the Black Sea and the Straits and possibly into the Mediterranean. This treaty opened the modern phase of the Straits question, and was the basis for all further treaties intil the Crimean War. After 1774, the Ottoman Empire and then Turkey were never again permitted to control the Straits without interference from other powers. The power most interested in this control was and still is Russia. From the eighteenth century on, the history of the Straits shows Russia's constant efforts to control them frustrated first by one power and then another. Her aim was to build a Black Sea fleet which should have complete freedom of navigation through the Straits. In order to gain this, she wished to have effective political domination over Constantinople by direct conquest of the Ottoman Empire, by establishing an exclusive protectorate over the Sultanate, or by peaceful partition of Turkey. During the

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nineteenth century, the duel was chiefly between the Russian Bear and the British Lion, While the Sultan looked helplessly on, there were numerous Russo-Turkish wars, and the Straits themselves became the subject of innumerable treaties, conventions, and protocols, which were torn up as soon as they were signed.

England's attention was first drawn to the strategic importance of the Straits during Napoleon's Egyptian expedition when the Russian fleet emerged at Turkey's request. In 1807, Alexander of Russia tried to work out a partition scheme with Napoleon, but the two leaders were unable to agree on the matter of Constantinople and the Straits. Meanwhile, by the Peace of the Dardanelles of 1809, Britain recognized the principle of closing the Straits to ships of war in peacetime, the "ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire", and in so doing became the guardian of the Straits almost as much as Turkey.(1)

Russia succeeded in strengthening her influence by forcing Turkey, during the chaos of the Greek Wars for Independence, to sign the Treaty of Ackerman in 1826,by which Russia was granted complete freedom "in all the seas and waters of the Ottoman Empire without any exception" for its merchant shipping.(2) A final settlement was made by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, which gave complete freedom to all Russian commercial vessels with the additional and unique proviso that no visit or search was to be

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exercised over these vessels passing through the Straits and any act interfering with this freedom by the Turkish Government would be met by reprisals from the Russian Government. These two Russian triumphs, however, were eclipsed by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi of 1833, which contained a secret clause stating that the Ottoman Empire was to "limit its actions in favor of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles, that is to say, not to permit any foreign ship of war to enter therein under any pretext whatever."(3)

However, this virtual protectorate over Turkey was liquidated by the Treaty of London in 1840, which, theoretically, was drawn up by the four powers Russia, Britain, Prussia, and Austria to protect Turkey and which restated the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire that no ships of war were to be permitted to pass through the Straits. For the first time a rule formerly recognized only through bilateral treaties with the Ottoman Empire became a part of a general treaty; a year later France joined the other powers in signing the Convention of the Straits, which made the principle a part of European international law. The Treaty of Paris in 1856, following the Crimean War in which England and France defeated Russia, reaffirmed the Straits Convention of 1841, but added the clause that each of the powers might send two light warships through the Straits for service at the mouth of the Danube. It also added the new conception that a

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3. Ibid., p.32

sea could be called "neutral", a term formerly applied only to land in international law. This treaty was a decisive defeat in Russia's aim to use the Straits for her own protection, because in case of war, the Sultan was permitted to allow non-Black Sea Powers entry through the Straits.

Russia did not intend to follow the Treaty of Paris any longer than necessary; in 1870, she formally circulated a note that she was no longer bound in respect to her sovereign rights in the Black Sea. Her complaint resulted in the Treaty of London in 1871, signed by Great Britain, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, which left the Straits closed but enlarged the Sultan's power to open them in peacetime to friendly powers and allowed the Russians a fleet in the Black Sea.

The Russians, still not satisfied, were again at war with Turkey by 1877. However, they were again blocked in their effort to open the Straits for their warships by the preliminary treaty of San Stefano between Turkey and Russia and by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 for the settlement of the affairs of the East signed by the Western Powers. The latter reaffirmed the status quo ante as determined by the treaties of 1856 and 1871.

Russia ostensibly accepted her diplomatic defeat, but did not forget. In 1881, she made a secret agreement with Austria-Hungary and Germany that the three powers would "take care in common that Turkey (should) make no exception to this rule (closure of the Straits) in the favor of the interests of any govern-

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ment whatsoever by lending to the warlike operations of a belligerent power" the Straits, and that if Turkey did so, she would be informed she was "puttimg herself in a state of war towards the injured party."[4] After 1890, however, German influence in Turkey began to increase, and there was, therefore, a trend toward anti-Russian feelings in the German Government.

After her war with Japan, Russia decided she needed an ally to support her claims for opening the Straits, and, therefore, settled her difficulties with Great Britain, making possible the Triple Entente of England, Russia, and France of 1907. Russia did not hesitate to reopen the question of the Straits to her new ally. Sir Edward Grey finally stated that "England must no longer make it a settled object of her policy to maintain the existing arrangement with regard to the passage of the Dardanelles."[5] Russia was encouraged by this statement; she felt that it marked "a great evolution in the relations of the two countries."[6] Great Britain seemed willing in principle to discuss a change, but she made no attempt to obtain the permission of the other powers.

In 1908, Russia used the tension that existed between Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Sandjak Railway plan to bring about a meeting between the two powers in Buchlau. There she

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During the Balkan Wars, Great Britain proposed informally the internationalization and neutralization of Constantinople, but the suggestion was unfavorably received by both Russia and France. At the peace negotiations, although not mentioned spe-

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cifically, undoubtedly influenced the Russian attitude. She not wanted to be certain that Turkey itself was intact, but also insisted that the strategic islands near the Dardanelles be kept under Turkish sovereignty and consented, finally, to their annexation by Greece only on condition of their being neutralized.

At the beginning of the World War, interest in the Straits was still as intense as it had ever been. Rumania had no door upon any other sea; Serbia and Hungary both had access to the Black Sea through the Danube River. Even Bulgaria, given the two mediocre ports of Dedeagatch and Port Lagos on the Aegean by the Balkans Wars (she did not retain these ports after 1918), was still interested in being able to use the Straits.

The World War made the Black Sea powers even more anxious to control their waterway. Throughout most of the war, Turkey was fighting against the Allies, and the Straits were closed to all warships, including those of the Black Sea powers. However, in August, 1914, two German warships passed through the Dardanelles, thus violating the treaties of 1856 and 1871, and anchored in Constantinople, where they stayed more than twenty-four hours without being requested to leave or being interned as international law demands. When the Allies protested, Turkey purchased these vessels for their own fleet in what was obviously a fictitious transaction. Rebaptized and recommissioned, they remained under German control and kept watch over the Straits. In September, 1914, a Turkish warship was stopped outside the

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Dardanelles and forced to turn back; the next day Turkey closed the Straits completely, thus cutting a vital line of communication between the Western Allies and Russia. After a skirmish with the Turkish fleet, Russia declared war on November 4th. This breaking of communication through the Straits between the Allies is believed to have prolonged the war for a year or more.

Early in 1915, Russia suggested a campaign against the Dardanelles from the Aegean side to distract the Turks, but the British developed the plan to include actual occupation of the Straits and reestablishment of communications between the Allies. Suspicious of ultimate British aims, Russia presented England and France with a memorandum requesting their consent to her outright annexation of Constantinople, the European coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora with its islands, and the Dardanelles together with the islands of Imbros and Tenedros, southern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line and a small strip of the Asiatic shores along the Ismid peninsula. Great Britain and France agreed to this request reluctantly and on condition that Russia in turn would consent to the satisfaction of British, French, and Italian claims and the recognition of their spheres of interest in the Near East.

The campaign was a colossal failure; British and French warships were unable to force the narrow Dardanelles. Six weeks later Allied landing parties on the shores of Gallipoli were slaughtered; 36,000 British troops were buried there. The

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failure to break Turkish resistance prevented an early end to the war; not long after this Russia withdrew from the conflict.

The outcome of the secret understanding among the Allies concerning the Straits was complete embarrassment for them. The new Bolshevik Government of Russia renounced any claims to the Straits; moreover, it published and denounced the treaties it had made with the Allies, and declared that Constantinople and the Straits ought to remain under Turkish sovereignty. This gesture began a friendship between Turkey and Russia which was much strengthened in the years that followed.

Thus, at the end of the World War, the most interested Black Sea power was much too busy with her internal affairs to worry about the Straits, while Turkey, under whose sovereignty the Straits remained, was much weakened by the war. The Western powers had an opportunity to do exactly as they wished with the Straits.

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CHAPTER II

THE TREATY OF SEVRES AND THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE

The first step in the settlement of the Straits problem after the World War was peace with Turkey, and, on October 30, 1918, the Armistice of Mudros was signed, opening the Straits by forcing the surrender of all Turkish military and naval forces. An Allied force of occupation, made up chiefly of British troops, was sent to strategic points controlling the Straits until a definite settlement could be made.

In January, 1918, President Wilson had declared in Point Twelve of his Fourteen Points that "the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees."[1] The first plan suggested for applying this principle would have given the United States a mandate over Constantinople and the Straits, but President Wilson refused to accept the mandate. Annexation by any one of the European Allies was out of the question because of jealousies among them; Turkey would have to maintain nominal sovereignty.

The result of Allied efforts at practical application of Wilson's Twelfth Point was the Treaty of Sevres, August, 1920, which left Constantinople in Turkish control, subject to modification of its status by the Allies if Turkey did not live up to the provisions of the treaty. These provisions were as follows: (1) The Straits were to be open bothin peace and war to merchant vessels, and the aircraftof all nations; (2) no act of

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hostility (unless under a decision of the League of Nations) could be committed in the Straits nor could the area be blockaded; (3) a Commission was to be set up composed of the Allied and Associated Powers plus Greece and Rumania, and, in addition, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, and Turkey, as soon as they were admitted to the League. The Commission was to have broad powers and was to be independent of the local authorities; at any time it could call for the assistance of the Allied troops maintained in the region in assuring freedom of passage.

Thus de facto control of the area by the Turks would be nullified directly by the creation of the Allied Commission and also indirectly by the Greek control of the European shores of the Dardanelles. Demilitarization of the Straits zone was provided so as to remove Turkish military influence, but since Constantinople had to made safe from hostile attack, and a general international guarantee would be too slow and ineffective in an emergency, joint Allied occupation was provided for.

The Treaty of Sevres was never ratified by Turkey; in consideration of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, the treaty was a satisfactory solution. However, the balance of power was completely altered within the next two years. The Soviet Union emerged as a united nation ready to repair whatever damage had been done to her international prestige, ready to renew her efforts to control the Straits. On the other hand, Turkey was rapidly becoming a modern nation, first, under the leadership of the Young Turks, and, later, Kemal Ataturk; she was strong

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enough to object effectively to the humiliating Treaty of Sevres.

In 1919, Greek troops landed in Smyrna with the permission of Great Britain and France (granted partly to forestall Italy in the Near East). The Greco-Turkish war thus begun caused a strong nationalist movement in Turkey. When France and Italy realized that Turkey was not only defeating the Greeks but was strong enough even to challenge the Allies, they made separate agreements with the new Turkish Government. Great Britain alone clung stubbornly to her support of Greece; she rushed troops to reinforce the defenses of Constantinople and to prevent the Turks from regaining control over the Straits. Her appeals to France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, who had been forced out of the area by that time, and even to her own Dominions in vain. Conversely, France and Italy became so annoyed as to recall their troops stationed nearby, leaving Britain to hold off the Turks alone. Italy felt Greek ambitions might be a threat to her own designs in Anatolia and was suspicious of too much British interest in the Greeks. On the other hand, France had become bitter after realizing that a three-power guarantee of the Straits meant that Britain, as the largest naval power, would have control. An Armistice was signed on October 11, 1922, by which Turkey agreed not to move against the neutral zone of Chanak and the Straits.

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the Angora National Pact, April, 1920, and voluntarily denouncing the Trans-Caucasian territories she had acquired earlier. Moreover, the Soviet Union gave arms and money to help Turkey in the war against the Greeks. In addition, Allied intervention in Russia made the new Soviet government equally hostile to the Allies, drawing the two countries together naturally. The main source of contention between them, the question of Armenia, was solved by a compromise agreement.

It was obvious that the Treaty of Sevres was not satisfactory for the new conditions; on November 20, 1922, a conference to draw up a final settlement was opened at Lausanne with representatives from Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, the United States, Turkey, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Belgium, and Portugal. The chief antagonists were Great Britain and the Soviet Union; their historic roles had been reversed for the Soviet Union wanted the Straits closed while Great Britain wanted them open. The Soviet Union had discovered that the free passage of Allied transports into the Black Sea allowed unwelcome interference in her internal affairs. Moreover, her fleet was disorganized and small; it was safer simply to close the Straits. Great Britain, on the other hand, saw that it would be most convenient if she or her allies could send ships into the Black Sea in case of trouble; formerly, Great Britain, on the other hand, had been opposed to opening them for egress only. Now she was anxious to have them opened for

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A special Straits Convention was attached to the Lausanne Treaty under Article 23, based on a draft drawn up by Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, and the Turkish delegate. It represented a compromise between the two antagonists. In time of peace, there was to be "complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and by night under any flag and with any kind of cargo" for "merchant vessels, including hospital ships, yachts and fishing vessels, and non-military aircraft."(2) If Turkey was neutral during the war, there was also to be freedom of passage: "the duties and rights of Turkey as a neutral power cannot authorize her to take any measures liable to interfere with navigation through the Straits."(3) If Turkey was a belligerent, she was to have "full power to take such measures as she (might) consider necessary to prevent enemy vessels from using the Straits."(4) These measures were "not to be of such a nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral vessels" provided they were not assisting the enemy "by carrying contraband, troops, or enemy nationals."(5) This principle had been fairly well established in the previous century.

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2. Treaty Series No. 16, London, 1923, p.113

3. Ibid., p.114

4. Ibid., p.115

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Warships of both neutral and belligerent countries were to have freedom of passage during a war if Turkey was neutral, but belligerent warships might not commit hostilities, or exercise the right of visit, search, and capture in the Straits, although these limitations did not apply to the detriment of belligerent rights in the Black Sea. If Turkey was belligerent, neutral vessels only were to have the right of freedom of passage, and measures taken by Turkey to prevent the passage of enemy forces were not to prejudice neutral rights.

The Straits Convention also provided for demilitarization of both the European and Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. However, Turkey was allowed to maintain a garrison

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not exceeding 12,000 men, an arsenal, and a naval base in Constantinople, and, in addition, Turkey had the right to transport her armed forces through the demilitarized zones. The islands in the Sea of Marmora and the Greek and Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea (Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, and the Rabbit Islands) were also demilitarized. Turkey and Greece could remilitarize these zones provided they notified the signatories and restored the status quo at the end of the war.

The regime of the Straits was to be supervised and controlled by the International Straits Commission, comprised of one representative of each signatory power (the United States would also be entitled to a seat upon agreement to the Convention). The Commission was under permanent presidency of Turkey and was required to send an annual report to the League of Nations. In order to offset the "unjustifiable danger" which the demilitarization of areas concerned might make to the safety of Turkey, as well as to the freedom of the Straits, the signatory powers agreed that "should the freedom of navigation of the Straits or the security of the demilitarized zones be imperiled by a violation of the provision relating to freedom of passage or by a surprise attack or some act of war or threat of war," they, "acting in conjunction, will meet such violation, attack or other act of war or threat of war, by all means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for this purpose."(7)

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7. *Ibid.*, p.121

T Turkey was better satisfied with this treaty than with the Treaty of Sevres. The security of Constantinople was much better safeguarded, and her demands for prestige were adequately satisfied by her presidency of the Commission in contrast to the Treaty of Sevres provision that the Commission was to be completely independent of the local authorities.

The Soviet Union was the only power dissatisfied with the compromise; the Soviet delegate was alone in maintaining that the Straits should be closed to warships both in peace and war. Turkey, although a close friend of the U.S.S.R.,did not support her view. She may still have been a little afraid of giving the Russians too much power and, at the same time, have felt that she was strong enough not to have to seek out Russian favor. The Soviet delegate, Monsieur Chicherin, signed under protest, and later, the Soviet Government refused to ratify the treaty.

The lack of Turkish support of Russian wishes did not, however, destroy Soviet-Turkish friendship. The Soviet Union, feeling herself to be in a weak position, decided there was less chance of Turkish exploitation of it if the friendship continued. Turkey, on her part, wanted a friendly Soviet to support her in any changes in the Straits regime later on. A treaty of neutrality and non-aggression, to be renewable every ten years, was signed by the two countries in December, 1925, in which each agreed to maintain her neutrality if the other was attacked by a third power and not to make any political or military alliance directed against the other signatory.

This regime of the Straits worked satisfactorily for several years. The annual reports made no mention of any difficulties of importance; freedom of navigation was proving beneficial to growing international trade. Even the demilitarization clauses did not worry Turkey since a general disarmament was expected. Two incidents, however, indicated the Soviet attitude clearly to alert observers. In February, 1924, at the Rome Naval Conference, Admiral Berens, representing the Soviet Union, claimed a maximum of 400,000 tons total tonnage for Soviet capital ships in opposition to the British suggestion of 110,000 tons unless the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea were closed to the fleets of non-littoral powers. This indirect complaint about the Straits regime had no effect other than to contribute to the general failure of the Naval Conference.

In January, 1930, two Russian warships passed the Straits supposedly unobserved by the Turkish officials, but obviously with their connivance. This demonstrated how difficult it would be to prevent Soviet violation of the convention if the Turco-Soviet friendship became too close, especially since the Straits Commission was pronounced powerless in such a case by the British government.

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CHAPTER III

TURKISH REQUESTS FOR REVISION OF THE STRAITS CONVENTION

World conditions ten years after the signing of the Straits Convention were not so rosy as the treaty makers had hoped they would be. There had been a series of treaty repudiations and undeclared wars. The Disarmament and World Economic Conferences had failed; rearmament was widespread. Germany, Japan, Italy, and other states were in the grip of the increasingly dynamic foreign policies of their authoritarian governments. The League had proved incapable of coping with major difficulties such as the Italo-Ethiopian affair and the Manchurian conflict. Even though sanctions could be passed, collective guarantees were slow in offering protection, slow in functioning, and ineffective in any case. Small powers, among them Turkey, no longer felt secure against aggression.

It is not surprising that Turkey now viewed as obsolete the Straits Convention of the Lausanne Treaty, which compensated for the demilitarization clauses with a collective guarantee. In addition to the inefficiency to be expected in the operation of any such guarantee, one of the four powers in this specific guarantee, Italy, was in conflict with the remaining two, Great Britain and France. The fourth, Japan, had already withdrawn from the League. Moreover, there was no clause in the Straits Convention which permitted Turkey to take measures before war broke out, and measures taken afterwards, as Ethiopia's case showed, would be too late.

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hanced her prestige enormously since 1920. She was becoming modern in every way--in customs, in education, in government, in a military sense. She had signed treaties of friendship with all the Western powers; she had been admitted to the League in 1932, and, in 1934, she was on the Council of the League. It was Turkey who had been largely instrumental in forming the Balkan Entente, and, at the same time, she had maintained her friendship with her Asiatic neighbors and with the Soviet Union. With her new importance as a full-fledged member of the family of nations she resented even more the fact that she did not have absolute sovereignty over the Straits zone, part of her own territory. One author suggested that the prestige motive was the main one, that it is "tempting to suppose that Turkey's complaints concerning the immediate menace to her security were deliberately somewhat exaggerated, and that she merely seized a long-awaited opportunity to take a step which, though based in part on considerations of long-time security, was very largely inspired by considerations of national prestige."(1) At any rate, prestige, coupled with her justified concern over the dangers of a demilitarized zone at the Straits, a concern which she could at least diminish by fortifying the area to the best of her ability, led Turkey to seek revision of the Straits Convention.

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Turkey again brought up the question during the bilateral Greco-Turkish negotiations in Rome, July, 1933, leading to the Balkan Pact. Turkey suggested a "Euxine Pact" by which permission for the remilitarization of the Straits zone might be ob-

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In May. 1934, the Turkish Government decided to inaugurate a seven year rearmament plan. She felt that the recent close friendship between Bulgaria and Jugoslavia offered a threat to her Thracian border. Moreover, Mussolini's declaration that "Italy's historic objectives are in Asia and Africa" had alarmed her,and his statement that he regarded Turkey as European power did not allay her fears for Anatolia.(2) M. Aras repeated his request for revision and questioned the efficacy of the guarantee clause of the Lausanne Straits Convention, since the League had been weakened by Japan's leaving and Italy's hostility. He and Sir John Simon had a lively correspondence on the matter with the result that M. Aras withdrew his request, assuring the British Government that "in the present circumstances the Turkish Government" did "not intend to pursue the matter."(3)

However, Turkey was not permanently discouraged, for, in April, 1935, during a discussion of M. Laval's draft resolution concerning sanctions, Aras remarked that Turkey considered the demilitarization clauses to be of a discriminatory nature. He proceeded to threaten that, if there should be any change in the

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The matter was mentioned briefly at the annual meeting of the Balkan Entente at Bucarest and again at the plenary meeting of the League Assembly in Geneva September 14, 1935. Turkey was becoming more amd more obsessed with the idea of remilitarization. During the session in November, when the imposing of sanctions on Italy was being discussed, the deputy Foreign Minister warned that "Turkey will not hesitate to take the necessary steps" to make the Straits secure "in case of unforseen occurrences."(4) There were such widespread rumors of the imminent closing of the Straits that no commercial shipping ventured through them for three days for fear of being stranded. However, Turkey did not close them, and her threat proved ineffective in the face of opposition from the Western powers.

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4. Ibid., p. 603

March. 1936, Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, and rumors were even more prevalent that Turkey was going to follow her example by seizing the Straits and refortifying them. During the special meeting of the League Council held in London to discuss the situation, the Turkish Foreign Minster raised the problem of the Straits informally with the representatives of the Western powers. It is certain that Turkey was tempted to confront the world with the accomplished fact as Germany had done. On the advice of the British Ambassador, Sir Percy Loraine, she decided to request the League for permission to refortify the Straits.

Turkey determined not to take direct action not so much because of any moral obligation or any genuine respect for international treaties, but because peaceful change was more advantageous to her. Turkey, while much stronger than before, was still a small power, and small states, especially at that time, depended on the large nations for protection. She "could obtain full satisfaction for her claims without undermining further either the Geneva system, to which she was now deeply committed, or the system of international law" "she depended on, and, "in addition, she would earn for herself all the moral prestige of being, in contrast with Germany, Austria, and Italy, the 'good boy of Europe.'"(5)

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5. Ibid., p.585

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a formal request for revision of the Straits Convention in regard to the remilitarization problem had been decided upon. Identical notes were sent to the representatives of the signatory powers in Angora, to Jugoslavia (who had not signed because of difficulties with Turkey over the Ottoman public debt), and to the Secretary-General of the League.

The note explained in detail why Turkey felt that a change was necessary and emphasized the good faith in which the request was made to ensure "the security of Turkey and the inviolability of Turkish territory" as well as "the development in a helpful spirit of commercial navigation between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea."(6) It also reminded the powers of her record of loyalty to her international agreements. Turkey requested an early discussion for revision and suggested May 11 as a suitable date. She again warned the signatory powers that if her request was not granted, she might "be led to take upon herself the responsibility" of carrying out the necessary measures.(7) She mentioned recent fortification of the Dodecanese Islands as a direct Italian threat to her own security at its most vulnerable point.

The reaction to the Turkish note was immediate and generally favorable. The Soviet Government was the most enthusiastic, writing, April 16, 1936, that the principle of full Turkish sovereignty had been afirmed in the Soviet-Turkish treaties and had been supported at the time of the Lausanne Treaty, and the Soviet

6. Ibid.,p.604

7. Ibid., p.605

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6. Ibid., p.804.

7. Ibid., p.805

Government had seen no reason to change its attitude.

Great Britain, too, sent a note April 16 saying that she was willing to deal with the matter without delay. This ready agreement meant, of course, a change in the British attitude; one reason was the non-applicability of the former objection that such a move would encourage similar German action concerning the Rhineland. More important was the British wish to find a new ally in the Mediterranean since the Italian upsetting of the earlier balance of power. Britain hoped that Turkey might still be kept from too close a friendship with the Soviet Union.

The French Government also sent its immediate approval of the Turkish note. Although she was opposed, in general, to treaty revision, she was anxious to see an increase in the influence of her ally, the U.S.S.R.

The Balkan states were not so enthusiastic in their answers; they were inclined to be suspicious and jealous of Turkey's acquiring too much power. Greece looked forward to the remilitarization of the Straits area because, since the Greco-Turkish Pact, Turkey and she had been friendly and also because it would justify Greek plans to refortify the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace.(8) Jugoslavia also approved the proposal on the grounds that any reinforcement of the security of a member of the Balkan Entente would be of advantage to the others. Neither

8. The Greek islands of Chios, Samos, Mytilene and Icaria were demilitarized under a different heading in the Treaty of Lausanne and were therefore not affected by the Turkish proposal.

Bulgaria nor Rumania liked the idea of a Soviet-Turkish lake. However, Bulgaria felt that, if this revision succeeded, it would give her an opportunity to press the proposed revision of the arms clause of the Treaty of Neuilly and the article concerning her right to an outlet on the Aegean Sea. Rumania, who had more to lose than any other European state because she had no outlet on the Aegean Sea, felt that she must approve of the Turkish suggestion or lose an ally.

The Turkish Government, realizing that the Balkan states might be reluctant to approve her suggestion, sent the Secretary of the Foreign Office on a tour of the Balkan capitals during the last part of April. The Balkan states, probably convinced by threats of Italian preponderance in the Mediterranean, sent their answers by the end of April, Bulgaria on the 24th, Greece on the 22nd, Jugoslavia on the 28th, and Rumania on the 29th. They reaffirmed their positions at the meeting of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente on May 4th, and all agreed to support Turkey on condition that Turkey always advise them before closing the Straits in time of war, and that then they should meet to decide on the common measures to be taken in such a case.

Japan acknowledged the note and notified Turkey of her acceptance in principle of the request; Italy did not condescend to answer the note. The only indication she gave of her opinion on the matter appeared in the official press, that the Straits question was one affecting the situation in the Mediterranean as a whole and not merely the security of Turkey. Such an attitude

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on Italy's part was embarrassing to the Turkish Government and the other Lausanne signatories, because Italy, for several years, had had the largest tonnage passing through the Straits annually. Italy was probably suspicious of British and French motives for accepting the Turkish request, and, perhaps, even felt that she could bargain with the other powers concerning Ethiopia or the Mediterranean naval arrangements between Great Britain, France, Turkey, Greece, and Jugoslavia, which had been annoying her. The Italian press did hint that perhaps Italy would cooperate on the Straits issue after the raising of sanctions at the League Council Meeting in June.

Germany's reaction, as an interested but uninvited state, was favorable. Her own interests were, as a naval power, in her increasingly frequent use of the Danube River. Turkey's move constituted, Germany said, a continuation of her own policy of rejecting certain ideas of security. However, she was annoyed with Soviet support of the Turkish desire when the Soviet Government would not do the same for her under similar circumstances. Another interested state, Hungary, approved wholeheartedly because it was to set a useful precedent for treaty revision.

Although the necessary approval had been won by the end of April, the signatory nations showed no great haste in setting a date. A rumor that the Turkish Government had already begun refortification of the Straits reminded them that Turkey was not to be satisfied with mere promises. The date was finally set as June 22nd, four days before the League Council Meeting

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at Geneva; it was hoped that by the time the Conference resumed its plenary meetings at the beginning of July after the Geneva meetings that an Italian representative would be sitting with them.

CHAPTER IV

THE MONTREUX CONFERENCE OF 1936

The Montreux Conference opened on June 22, 1936 in the Salle des Fetes of the Montreux Palace Hotel with M. Motta, serving as president, welcoming the delegates on the behalf of the Swiss Government. The chief delegates were Mr. Bruce, representing Australia, Dr. Nicolaev, representing Bulgaria, M. Paul-Boncour, France, Lord Stanhope, Great Britain, M. Politis, Greece, Mr. Sato, Japan, M. Titulescu, Rumania, M. Litvinov, the U.S.S.R., M. Rustu Aras, Turkey, and M. Subotic, representing Jugoslavia. The Dominions of India, South Africa, New Zealand, Irish Free State, and Canada sent letters stating that, although they would not send delegates, they would be willing to accept the decisions of the conference. Mr. Bruce of Australia was elected president as being the most impartial representative present because his country's interest in the Straits was obviously indirect. M. Aghnides, of the League Secretariat, was elected Secretary-General.

The Conference itself was divided into two main periods. During the first, a Turkish draft, prepared by the Turkish Government earlier in June, was adopted as the basis for discussion. The first reading was completed by June 26the, and the plenary meetings were adjourned to permit the chief delegates to participate in the Geneva Council and Assembly meetings. The drafting and technical committees, however, remained in session during this adjournment. On July 6, plenary sessions were resumed, with a British draft drawn up during the interim as the basis

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for discussion. On July 18, a compromise was finally reached, and, on July 20, the Montreux Convention was officially signed.

The Turkish draft provided for changes more drastic than had been anticipated by the signatory powers. The preliminary negotiations had been concerned only with the demilitarization clauses of the Lausanne Straits Convention. In May, the British Government had received assurances through M.Aras that only these clauses and those immediately related were to be dealt with and then only on the basis of strict reciprocity between Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. It is believed, therefore, that the Soviet Union, obviously stronger than she had been at the time of the Lausanne Conference, had brought pressure to bear on the Turkish Government between May and the beginning of the Montreux Conference. The Turkish draft was, probably, the result of Turco-Soviet collaboration.

The preamble, to "regulate the passage and navigation of the Straits in such a way as to safeguard international commerce within the framework of the security of Turkey," made no mention whatever of the principle of freedom of the Straits, as had the Lausanne Treaty.(1) Articles 3-9, providing for the demilitarization of the Straits area was left out entirely, along with Articles 10-16, dealing with the composition and functions of the International Commission. Turkey was satisfied with the general principles for passage of commercial ships in peacetime, making no important changes there.

1. D.A.Routh."The Montreux ConventionRegarding the Regime of the Black Sea Straits," Survey of International Affairs, London, 1937, p.614

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1. D. J. Smith, The Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Black Sea Straits, Survey of International Affairs, London, 1937, p.414

Two changes were suggested concerning rights of merchant ships during war. The Turkish draft included a paragraph in Article 3 reiterating what the Lausanne Convention had mentioned only incidentally that these rights should be conditioned by Turkey's obligations under the Covenant of the League. This addition was an indication that Turkey wanted to be sure she could legally stop or hold the aggressor's merchant ships. Also, when Turkey was belligerent, merchant ships were not to pass by day or by night, but only by day and along a route approved by the Turkish authorities.

In the section dealing with warships, the Turkish draft also contained changes; in Article 6, was the statement that, in time of peace, warships were to pass by day only and then just for the purpose of paying courtesy visits. Moreover, they must give one month's notice before doing so. The maximum force was to be limited to 14,000 tons although riverain powers might send up to 25,000 tons through the Straits, with the special permission of the Turkish Government, on condition of going through the Straits singly. None of these restrictions had appeared in the Lausanne Convention. Also, total tonnage of all non-riverain powers was not to exceed 28,000 tons, and no non-riverain warship might remain more than fifteen days. In wartime, if Turkey was neutral, the same regulations were to be in force with the additional provision that no warship was permitted to commit an act of hostility within the Straits. If, on the

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other hand, Turkey was belligerent, no warship could pass the Straits without obtaining the special permission of the Turkish Government; in contrast, the Lausanne Convention allowed neutral warships to pass the Straits on their own responsibility. By this provision, the Turkish Government gained practically complete control over the Straits during a war in which she was belligerent. By the Turkish draft, submarines were not to be permitted to pass, and both civil and military aircraft was required to fly along a route indicated by the Turkish authorities.

Article 9 of the Turkish draft provided that if Turkey felt herself faced with a general of special threat of war, she would have the right to apply the provisions of Article 8, provided she informed the signatories and the Secretary-General of the League. This was an innovation, for the Lausanne Convention had contained no provision for action before war actually began, and, as mentioned earlier, this was one of the Turkish objections to the Lausanne Straits Convention.

In this draft convention, Turkey had increased her security and her strategic strength. The threat to Constantinople had been lessened not only by the refortification allowed but by the limitation on the size of ships permitted to pass through the Straits. The latter was planned so that there would never be a naval force in the Straits whose total tonnage exceeded one-half of the effective Turkish. The draft was also favorable to the Soviet Union since it put further limits on the non-riverain powers with only one limitation affecting the Soviet Union, that

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limiting the size and form of ships which might pass through at any one time. There was to be no limit whatsoever on the the total tonnage the Soviet Union might send into the Mediterranean; in other words, the Soviet Union had almost gained the complete freedom of egress she had always wanted.

In spite of her violent objections, there was nothing for Great Britain to do but accept the Turkish draft as the basis for discussion. However, this put the British delegation on the defensive, and almost led to the failure of the convention. Probably Turkish reminders that she intended to protect the Straits eventually anyway was the force which prevented breakdown of the conference. According to the British Government, the Turkish draft was far too favorable to the Soviet Union; she felt that the Black Sea's becoming a Soviet lake with practically unlimited egress for the Russian fleet, in upsetting the balance of power in the Mediterranean, might precipitate a general race in armaments. Britain had a lurking mistrust of Soviet intentions, and favored returning to the nineteenth century policy of close collaboration with Turkey. England had no desire to join the Franco-Soviet bloc, but at the same time, she did not wish to see Europe divided into two opposing groups. She was also anxious to see that other powers, such as Germany, were pleased by the Convention.

The general Soviet attitude, of course, was that the Straits be wide open to her own warships but as near shut as possible to warships of non-riverain powers. The Soviet delegate

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made this feeling clear on the second day of the Conference:

> "we all know that these Straits...have a special character and that they are not comparable with certain international canals and other Straits, in this, that they do not lead anywhere else than into the Black Sea, which is a closed sea; they cannot be utilized for transit to a destination of other countries. It is in taking into consideration these circumstances that numerous European statesmen, including, for example, Lord Palmerston, the Duke of Wellington, pronounced themselves on numerous occasions in favor of the closure of the Straits. Closure of these Straits is of very great importance for the security, not only of Turkey, but of all the States of the Black Sea. Doubtless the best way to guarantee the security would be to close completely the Straits to warships of non-riverain States. Nevertheless, my Government does not insist on this closure and is ready to support the Turkish proposition tending to keep the Straits open for certain ends and under certain limitations to the ships of all nations, with full freedom of passage by the Straits for commercial vessels." (2)

Another statement made by M. Litvinov on June 24th will make this fundamental attitude even clearer:

> "I wish to emphasize that we cannot neglect the fact that there exists no other sea which is in the same geographical situation as the Black Sea. If the Mediterranean Sea or the Baltic Sea were in the same geographical situation..., I should not oppose equality of rights between the Black Sea States and those of the rest of the world; but...the Mediterranean is not a closed sea. you can penetrate it through its two extremities...If, to the contrary, you wish to penetrate the Black Sea, it is for a definite end. This may be either to pay a visit of to offer your assistance to a state in difficulty, in application of a decision of the League of Nations. For my part, I cannot imagine another legitimate aim for which foreign vessels would enter the Black Sea." (3)

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France was in agreement with the Soviet Union for similar reasons, and, in addition, wanted to protect her treaty with Rumania, an indispensable factor in the French Alliance system east of the Alps, from interference of any kind. The Rumanian, Jugoslav, Greek, and Bulgarian delegates were all also in favor of the Soviet point of view and the Franco-Soviet bloc.

Japan was the only power present to uphold the British view that the Turkish draft was too favorable to the Soviet Union. Probably Japan was thinking of her advantage in 1905 when the Straits were closed; it would be preferable to prevent the Soviet Union from transferring her fleet from one sea to the other.

Turkey watched this dispute between the Soviet Union and Great Britain impatiently; she showed her great anxiety by in-

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Turkey watched this dispute between the Soviet Union and Great Britain temperamentally; she shared her great anxiety by in-

serting a clause in her draft that the convention should come into force from the date of its signature, a most unusual provision.

On June 27, M. Litvinov and M. Paul-Boncour had an informal discussion with Mr. Eden in which a compromise was reached in principle. However, during the period when the delegates were at Geneva, a British draft was drawn up, bringing forward points Britain had hitherto been unable to bring out. These new issues made the conflict between the Soviet Union and Great Britain even more acute than before the Eden-Litvinov conversations.

The British draft, called a "new version" of the Turkish draft, was circulated on July 4; it reaffirmed the principle of freedom of passage left out in the Turkish draft, and added that it should "remain in vigor without limit of time."(4) In Section 1, Turkey was to make no charges for the sanitary inspection of ships not calling at Turkish ports. Turkey had wished to change these dues. According to the Section concerning warships, ships designed for the transport of inflammable liquids was excluded from the definitions of auxiliary warships.

Most of the innovations of the British draft dealt with the passage of warships through the Straits. It shortened the notice required for visits from non-riverain warships from one month to fifteen days. The maximum tonnage was limited to one-half the tonnage of the Turkish fleet or to 15,000 tons, if the latter should be greater. The clause permitting littoral powers

4. Ibid., p.627

setting a clause in her draft that the convention should come into force from the date of its signature, a most unusual provision.

On June 27, M. Litvinov and M. Ismi-Bonsour had an informal discussion with Mr. Eden in which a compromise was reached in principle. However, during the period when the delegates were at Geneva, a British draft was drawn up, bringing forward points Britain had hitherto been unable to bring out. These new issues made the conflict between the Soviet Union and Great Britain even more acute than before the Eden-Litvinov conversations.

The British draft, called a "new version" of the Turkish draft, was circulated on July 4; it reaffirmed the principle of freedom of passage left out in the Turkish draft, and added that it should "remain in vigor without limit of time."(4) In Section 1, Turkey was to make no charges for the sanitary inspection of ships not calling at Turkish ports. Turkey had wished to change these dues. According to the section concerning warships, ships designed for the transport of inflammable liquids was excluded from the definitions of auxiliary warships.

Most of the innovations of the British draft dealt with the passage of warships through the straits. It shortened the notice required for visits from non-Riverain warships from one month to fifteen days. The maximum tonnage was limited to one-half the tonnage of the Turkish fleet or to 15,000 tons, if the latter should be greater. The clause permitting littoral powers

4. Ibid., p.607

to send out single ships up to 25,000 tons with Turkish permission was completely omitted. Moreover, limitations on non-riverain warships should not prevent the visit of a fleet of any size to a Turkish port on the invitation of the Turkish Government, provided it left the Straits by the way it entered.

The British added, too, the escalator clause, providing that the tonnage of non-riverain powers was not to exceed 30,000 (28,000 was the figure in the Turkish draft) tons unless the tonnage of the largest riverain fleet in the Black Sea should come to exceed that of the largest fleet in that sea at the time of the signing of the Convention by more than 10,000 tons. After this point, the total allowed to any non-riverain power was to be increased by a quantity equal to the excess up to 45,000 tons. Any one non-riverain power was to be limited to three-quarters of the total permitted all non-riverain powers together. In addition, any power, having no force or one of less than 10,000 tons in the Black Sea, would have the right to send a naval force for "humanitarian purposes" up to 10,000 tons, subject, of course, to the special permission of the Turkish Government.(5) If a naval force is sent for a humanitarian purpose, it might remain without time limit, if not, the time limit was one month.

In Wartime, with Turkey neutral, the regualtions were to be the same as in peacetime. As in the Lausanne Convention, the British draft stated that these conditions should not be appli-

5. Ibid., p.629

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In wartime, with Turkey neutral, the regulations were to be the same as in peacetime. As in the Lausanne Convention, the British draft stated that these conditions should not be applied

5. Ibid., p.659

cable to a belligerent power to the detriment of its belligerent rights. In case of war, in which Turkey was belligerent, decisions were to be entirely in the hands of the Turkish Government. In reference to Turkey's provision in case of a threat of war, the British draft coincided, but also stated that Turkey must not only notify the signatories of the Convention and the League Council, but must agree to cancel any measures it was planning to take, if the League Council decided they were not justified by a two-thirds majority. British restrictions on civil aircraft were not so strict as the Turkish. Moreover, it provided that the International Commission of the Straits should continue its functions of collecting statistics and providing information necessary for applying the limiting clauses. In conclusion, the British wished the new Convention to remain in force for fifty years.

The British draft, then, was nearly as favorable to Turkey as the Turkish draft with the exception of more power's being given to the League and the retaining of the International Commission for some purposes. The draft was aimed chiefly at limiting Soviet gains and trying to make the passage limitations more reciprocal. In stating that regulations were not to be to the detriment of belligerent rights, the draft excluded the possibility of the Soviet's fleet emerging into the Mediterranean to attack a hostile fleet and then retiring unpursued into the Black Sea. With its provisions concerning the tonnage permitted each non-riverain power and the escalator clause, the draft

able to a belligerent power to the detriment of its belligerent rights. In case of war, in which Turkey was belligerent, destroyers were to be entirely in the hands of the Turkish Government. In reference to Turkey's provision in case of a threat of war, the British draft coincided, but also stated that Turkey must not only notify the signatories of the Convention and the League Council, but must agree to cancel any measures it was planning to take, if the League Council decided they were not justified by a two-thirds majority. British restrictions on civil aircraft were not so strict as the Turkish. Moreover, it provided that the International Commission of the Straits should continue its function of collecting statistics and providing information necessary for applying the limiting clauses. In conclusion, the British wished the new Convention to remain in force for fifty years.

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made certain that a large naval force could be collected in the Black Sea on case of a coalition by the non-riverain powers.

The British draft was the basis for discussion in the last part of the Montreux Conference, and, since a brief description of the main differenced between the Turkish draft and the British draft has been given, it was thought best to study the way in which the compromises were reached on the basis of the final Montreux Convention.

The first six articles of the British draft were accepted by the conference. Article 1"recognized and affirmed the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits." (6) Articles 2 through 6 deal with merchant ships; no important change was made from the Lausanne Straits Convention. In peacetime and in time of war with Turkey neutral, there was to be complete freedom of passage, while, in time of war when Turkey was belligerent, merchant ships belonging to a power at war with Turkey would have freedom of passage provided they entered by day and followed a route indicated by the Turkish authorities anddid not, in any way, assist the enemy.

Section II was concerned with warships; many controversial issues were brought up in the discussion of this section. Article 9 provided that "naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid" would not as do warships, be required to notify the Turkish Government in advance of their passage or be counted in the calculation for

6. James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak. Turkey at the Straits New York, 1940, p.154

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(8) James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits New York, 1940, p.164

total tonnage, but would be subjected to all other rules laid down for warships.[7] The French Government had tried to have such fuel-ships taken off the list of vessels of war completely so that she could import oil from Soviet and Rumanian oil-fields in sufficient quantities even in wartime.

Articles 10,11,12, and 13 embodied concessions to the Russian desires; Article 10 provides that in peacetime, light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits.. provided that such transit is begun during daylight."[8] Article 11 states that "Black Sea powers may send through the Straits capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid down in the first paragraph of Article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers."[9] Put together these two articles mean that while the non-riverain powers are restricted from sending other than "light vessels" through the Straits without adhering to limitation rules, the Soviet Union can send through any number of ships of any size, with the permission of the Turkish Government. The term "light surface vessel" was designed to exclude all types of heavily armed vessels, including the German "pocket battleship" which the 10,000 ton limit of the British draft would not have covered.

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7. Ibid,, p.157 8. Loc. cit. 9. Ibid.,p.158

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7. Ibid., p.197 8. Loc. cit. 9. Ibid., p.198

Article 12 was also a concession to the Soviet delegation in that "Black Sea powers ..(were)..to have the right to send through the Straits...submarines constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea."(10) France had wanted treatment of submarines on the same basis as warships, but both Britain and the Soviet Union opposed this suggestion. The Soviet Union maintained that the only exception to total exclusion should be made in favor of the Black Sea powers becasue of the absence of facilities for the construction of submarines in Black Sea dockyards.

Articles 13 concerned the number of days' notice required by the Turkish Government from warships passing through the Straits. As noted before, the Turkish draft had asked for a notification of one month while the British draft suggested fifteen days. The Soviet delegate suggested a fifteenn day notification period for non-riverain powers and a three-day notification for Black Sea powers.

The question of maximum tonnage to be allowed passage through the Straits was one of the problems causing much discussion. The Turkish draft provided for a maximum of 14,000 tons, that is, one-half of the Turkish fleet, while the British wanted a 16,000 ton limit so that two light cruisers with six-inch guns might be allowed to pass through. When 15,000 was was decided on as the compromise, Mr. Litvinov suggested an amendment: "If we limit passage to 15,000 tons, it will be im-

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possible for us to send greater units through the Straits from one port to another, and I shall be obliged to make an exception in this regard. One cannot divide units; one must even send them at a single time and, even, in case of need, with an escort."(11) The Turkish delegate brought forth an amendment satisfying Soviet desires for special privileges for Black Sea powers, and caused Lord Stanley of the British delegation to say "if this clause is to give reciprocity and if the non-riverain powers of the Black Sea are to have the same advantage, we are prepared to accept the amendment immediately because it represents a step toward complete freedom of the seas; but if this advantage is only to be accorded to the riverain powers of the Black Sea, that would go entirely against the principle of reciprocity which we have always had in view."(12) However, in spite of British objections, Article 11, already noted, gave the Soviet Union the special consideration she wanted.

Article 15 states that no vessel of war in transit shall make use of any aircraft, and Article 16, that no warship shall remain longer within the Straits than is necessary. Article 17 provided for the courtesy visits suggested in the British draft.

Article 18 settled the aggregate tonnage which non-riverain powers may have in the Black Sea in peacetime. This was one of the most controversial issues of the conference and was not finally agreed upon until shortly before the close of the Conference. As mentioned before, the Turkish draft suggested

11. Harry N. Howard."The Montreux Convention of the Straits,1936" Dept. of State Bulletin,vol.XV,No. 375, p.440. 12. Loc.cit.

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13. Ibid., p.443 14. Loc. cit.

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13. Ibid., p.445. 14. Loc. cit.

The provision in the British draft for a force of 15,000 tons to enter for "humanitarian purposes" also caused much discussion. M. Litvinov doubted the utility and the purpose of humanitarian visits in the Black Sea, since there had not been such a visit since 1923, and, he felt that if the British figure of 15,000 tons were accepted "we might find ourselves in the Black Sea in the presence of naval forces superior to our own."(15) A Soviet delegate offered the following amendment: "Nevertheless, if in exceptional cases such an earthquake or other calamity caused by the elements of nature, one of the non-riverain powers desires to send into this sea, for humanitarian purposes, one of its light surface warships and if, at the same time, the global tonnage...is entirely utilized by other non-riverain powers, the entrance of the said ship may take place with the consent of all the riverain states of the Black Sea, on the condition that any later entrance of naval forces of non-riverain powers will be effected only within the limit of the global tonnage."(16) The Bulgarian delegate finally suggested the compromise which finally became part of Article 18. Article 18 allows no more than 8,000 tons to enter and then only if either the global tonnage limit has not been reached or, if it has or will be by the additional 8,000 tons, when the Black Sea Powers have been informed and made no objection.

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17. Ibid., p. 440

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Regonal pacts such as the Franco-Soviet pact, retorted the British delegate, were framed in such a way as to act in advance of the Covenant. Thus, if the League failed to reach unanimity in naming the aggressor, Turkey might be placed in the

18. Routh, op. cit., p.632 19. Loc. cit.

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18. Morris, op. cit., p.232 19. Loc. cit.

position of having to discriminate between two sets of belligerents in virtue of some pact to which she was not a party, or of having to close the Straits against a power whose designation as an aggressor she had refused to accept. The reaction of the other delegates to this view was unfavorable. Bothe France and the Balkan states were suspicious of British intentions. M. Titulescu of Rumania accused Great Britain of pursuing one policy at Geneva and another at Montreux. They felt that Great Britain wanted to oppose the Soviet's League policy with an anti-League policy of her own.

On July 8 and 9, private conversations between M. Paul-Boncour, Lord Stanley and M. Litvinov brought no compromise. Mr. Rendel of the British delegation went back to England for instructions but returned with no change in the official British attitude. Britain still objected to the idea of Turkey's being a "non-belligerent ally" of France and the Soviet Union and asked why, if Turkey really wanted to be on such intimate terms with the two states, she didnot join the Franco-Soviet Pact outright.(20) Finally, the British delegation agreed to abandon their claims that warships be able to pass the Straits in pursuit of their "belligerent rights" on condition that the Franch and Soviet delegations agree not to continue their attempt to subordinate the Convention to the Franco-Soviet system of alliance.

On July 15, a compromise was reached; "vessels of war

20. Ibid.,p.635

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20. Ibid., p. 205

belonging to belligerent powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits except on cases arising out of the application of Article 25 of the present convention, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Convenant of the League of Nations."(21)

The settlement was looked on as a rather sudden retreat on the part of Great Britain. There was much speculation as to its real cause. A French newspaper maintained that it had to do with the signing of a German-Italian agreement of July 11. Britain was said to have made ocncessions to the Soviet Union so that this counter-move would alarm Germany and Italy and assure their acceptance of the invitations of July 9 to come to Brussels for the negotiation of a new Locarno settlement, but that this was a feint, and the real intention was to effect a new friendship with Turkey. It is more likely, however, that the British delegation, seeing all the delegates against them, realized that they could not possibly win their point, and rather than cause the failure of the conference, they gave in.

Article 20 stated that in wartime, Turkey being belligerent, "the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government."(22) This article was taken directly from the British draft and gave Turkey more power than she had given herself in her draft; the Turkish draft had specified only that neutral vessels would have to ask her permission before

21. Shotwell, op. cit., p.162 22. Loc. cit.

belonging to belligerent powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits except on cases arising out of the application of Article 25 of the present convention, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations."[21]

The settlement was looked on as a rather sudden retreat on the part of Great Britain. There was much speculation as to its real cause. A French newspaper maintained that it had to do with the signing of a German-Italian agreement of July 11. Britain was said to have made concessions to the Soviet Union so that this counter-move would alarm Germany and Italy and assure their acceptance of the invitations of July 9 to come to Brussels for the negotiation of a new Locarno settlement, but that this was a feint, and the real intention was to effect a new friendship with Turkey. It is more likely, however, that the British delegation, seeing all the delegates against them, realized that they could not possibly win their point, and rather than cause the failure of the conference, they gave in.

Article 20 stated that in peacetime, Turkey being belligerent, "the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government."[22] This article was taken directly from the British draft and gave Turkey more power than she had given herself in her draft; the Turkish draft had specified only that neutral vessels would have to ask her permission before

21. Shotwell, op. cit., p.122 22. Loc. cit.

they passed the Straits.

Article 21 removed one of the main objections Turkey had to the Lausanne Straits Convention: "should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war she shall have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of the present convention."[23] The rest of the article in the British draft, providing that Turkey discontinues the measures if two-thirds of the Council of the League felt that they are unjustified, was also included. Japan, as a non-member of the League, objected and insisted that a further clause be added making it necessary for a majority of the signatories to agree the measures are unjustified before Turkey should be compelled to cancel any measures she had taken. The Soviet delegation offered the further amendment that "warships and naval auxiliaries which after having passed through the Straits prior to the use by Turkey of the right conferred on it by the preceding paragraph, find themselves separated from their home ports, will be authorized to return to the said ports. It is, however, understood that Turkey cannot benefit from this right the ships of the State whose attitude had motivated the application of the present article."[24] The Rumanian delegation suggested an amendment which would give Turkey less complete control; "in case Turkey should consider itself menaced by a danger of imminent war it would have the right to apply the dispositions of Article 17 (of the British draft, leaving the matter to the discretion of

23. Loc. cit. 24. Howard, op. cit., p.441

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Turkey) in regard to warships and naval auxliaries belonging to the State whose attitude constituted for it such a menace."[25] The Turkish delegation felt it was unable to accept this amendment since it would be difficult for Turkey to assure navigation of warships in all security if the Straits were put in a state of defense. M. Litvinov declared further that "I plead not only in favor of the Black Sea states when I demand that ships be authorized to return to their base. I speak for the generality of states, for all navies in the Black Sea at a given moment, and I propose that they be permitted to return to their base outside the Black Sea."[26] The right of warships to return to their bases, as insisted on by the Soviet delegation, was included in Article 21.

Section III dealt with aircraft. The problem of passage of aircraft in the region of the Straits caused much discussion not only as to the flights over the Straits but as to the sovereign rights of Turkey to regulate such flights. M.Paul-Boncour suggested that the same provisions for flights should be made between the Black and Mediterranean Seas, but M.Aras remarked that "the subject of our discussion is the zone of the Straits not the rest of Turkey."[27] According to the final solution, civil aircraft may pass over Turkish territory if they follow the route indicated by the Turkish Government "outside the forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits."[28]

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26. Ibid., p.442 27. Loc. cit. 28. Shotwell, op.cit., p. 164

No mention of military aircraft is made, showing the failure of the French to obtain special privileges for Russian airplanes coming to the assistance of France under the Franco-Soviet Pact. The Soviet Union was not too sorry about the ommission for she really preferred immunity from attack by aircraft in the Black Sea to the privilege of being permitted to help France. France also failed in her attempt to obtain permission for the passage of aircraft carriers. They were not included in the category of "light surface vessel", and the Soviet Union opposed the suggestion on the ground that aircraft carriers in the Black Sea might threaten her industrial regions on the Black Sea coast.

Section IV, "General Provisions" provides, first, that the functions of the International Commission be transferred to the Turkish Government (Article 24). The British delegation was practically alone in its protest against complete abolition of the International Commission of the Straits; even in its draft it maintained the commission for collecting statistics and other information. It, said the British, provided a visible symbol of the principle that the Straits constituted an international waterway,[29] and that its abolition might set a precedent for the abolition of similar international bodies elsewhere. However, the British abandoned the effort when it was clear that the Turkish delegate would not consider a compromise. This

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Section V, "Final Provisions," contains regulations concerning ratification, accession, duration, and revision. The treaty was to be open to accession by any power signatory to the Treaty at Lausanne, in other words, Italy could sign it later, if she wished to. By Article 28, the Convention was to remain in force for twenty years even though both the British and Turkish drafts proposed fifteen years. At the end of each five year period, each signatory would be "entitled to initiate

30. Howard, op. cit., p.445

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a proposal for amending one or more provisions;" any request for a revision to Articles 14 or 18 would have to be supported by one other contracting power and to other articles two other contracting powers would have to agree. If diplomatic channels failed, a conference would be held at which Articles 14 and 18 would need a three-quarters majority for revision and all others would have to be unanimous. The latter provision did not entirely please the British delegate for he went on to say Great Britain had given their permission to certain objectionable features only because they thought that "the five year revision.. (would)...not be subordinated to the veto of a power, which, for one reason or another, would be opposed to revison."(31)

The Annexes to the Montreux Convention were of a technical nature and will not be discussed in detail. Annex I defined the taxes and dues to be imposed by the Turkish authorities on vessels passing through the Straits. Annex II provided definitions of various types of war vessels as laid down in the London Naval Treaty of March, 1936. Special provision was made for the passage through the Straits of three old Japanese training ships in Annex III. Annex IV listed categories for the calculation of tonnage passing the Straits. A final protocol permitted Turkey to begin remilitarizing the Straits on the day of the signature of the Convention, and to apply the new regime of the Straits as of August 15.

In accordance with the final protocol, on July 20, 1936,

31. Shotwell, op. cit., p.166

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In accordance with the final protocol, on July 20, 1936,

32. Shotwell, op. cit., p.188

the day the Montreux Convention was signed, an extraordinary meeting of the Turkish Cabinet was held at Angora and on midnight of the same day, 30,000 Turkish troops marched into the demilitarized zone of the Straits, where they found awaiting them the whole of the Turkish fleet led by the battleship Avuz (the new name of the notorious Goeben). The next morning President Kemal Ataturk toured the Straits zone. On August 24, the International Commission of the Straits sent a message to the Secretary-General of the League announcing its decision to wind up its existence and hand over its functions to the Turkish Government.

The Montreux Convention, entirely aside from its at least temporary solution of the Straits problem, is important because it represents a peaceful solution to an issue which might easily have led to war and because of its influence on the larger issues of naval strategy and European politics. It helped throw light on the new situation in the Mediterranean and in forcing the governments concerned to clarify their future policies in the light of the failure of sanctions. Although because of Articles 19, 21, and 25 some claim that it strengthened the League's position in European politics, actually with it "yet another instrument of international supervision was abolished and with it a precedent for the internationalization of various key strategic position on the Earth's surface which have become of great value in the future evolution of the system of collective security."(32)

32. Routh, op. cit., p.586

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32. Smith, op. cit., p.368

The signing of the Montreux Convention coincided too exactly with the outbreak of General Franco's revolt against the Spanish Government to be as completely effective in clearing the air in the Mediterranean as it might have been. Its effect was more of an indirect one of hastening the end of Mediterranean naval agreements among the Sanctionist's powers and possibly contributing toward the signing of the Anglo-Italian Gentlemen's Agreement the following January.

The reaction to the Montreux Convention was generally favorable. Great Britain is said to have considered the budding Turco-British friendship and its resultant reinforcement of the balance of power in the Mediterranean sufficient compensation for not getting exactly what she wanted in the treaty. Mr. Eden made a speech in the House of Commons on July 27th stating that the new settlement was "very satisfactory" because it maintained as far as possible the principle of freedom of the Straits as an international waterway, and at the same time provided an outstanding example of treaty revision by peaceful methods.(33) He also thanked the Turkish Government for their special statement at the end of the conference that they would take especial care of the graves of those who died in the Gallipoli campaign.

The Soviet Union was pleased about the improvement of the new convention over the Lausanne Convention, but it was not entirely satisfied, as shown by Litvinov's statement at the end of the conference: "The Conference had recognized, although in an

33. Ibid., p.645

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53. Ibid., p.865

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The French Government was fairly well satisfied although it had not obtained full recognition of regional pacts, but it had hopes, which were shared by Rumania, Greece, and Jugoslavia, that the detente reached at the end of the Conference would lead to a Mediterranean Pact.

Greece also approved and announced that she was in no hurry to refortify the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, although she now had the right to do so. The Bulgarians regarded the new convention as a precedent for the revision of the Treaty of Neuilly and seemed to have hopes, after the rapprochement it reached

34. Howard, op. cit., p.446

35. George Glasgow, "Turkey and the Straits," The Contemporary Review, 157, April, 1940, p.495

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34. Howard, op. cit., p.446

35. George Glasgow, "Turkey and the Straits," The Contemporary Review, 157, April, 1940, p.405

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Germany, as just mentioned, pointedly expressed her disapproval. Germany had had an unofficial observer at the Montreux Conference, who took home a full report of the discussions. The German press belittled the importance of the Convention and commented on the fickleness of British policy. On February 26, 1937, the German Government informed the Turkish Government through diplomatic channels that certain clauses in the Montreux Convention were not regarded with favor by Germany, particularly those relating to the egress of Soviet warships into the Mediterranean. The Turkish Government was somewhat concerned, but merely retorted that since Germany was neither a signatory of the Montreux Convention nor a Mediterranean power, the matter was no business of hers, and Turkey would "brook no interference in matters vital to her security."(36)

The hostile attitude of Italy is much more important because she is a Mediterranean power and was a signatory of the Lausanne Convention. Italy's attitude before the Montreux conference has already been discussed; at the opening of the Montreux Conference there was an interview between Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, and the Turkish Ambassador to Rome. Italy objected to the Turkish desire for remilitarization while the Turkish ambassador tried to explain that Italy should have an

36. Routh, op. cit., p.648

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36. Howard, op. cit., p.418

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37. Ibid., p.625 38. Ibid., p.626

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87. Ibid., p.688 88. Ibid., p.688

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Italy's stubbornness increased the hostility of the other states toward her; their feeling was that Italy would have to adhere to the Montreux Convention anyway, but that it was too bad that Italian absence from the Conference prevented any more general discussion toward reestablishing a normal situation in the Mediterranean. On July 13, M. Aras made a declaration intended to convey the impression the Turkish delegation did not wish the Convention to be left open to the signature of powers not present at the Conference, but that it reserved the right to sign bilateral agreements on the basis of the new Convention. Four days before the signing of the treaty, M.Aras had an interview with the permanent representative of Italy at Geneva and,in the final text of the Convention, provision was made for subsequent Italian adherence.

After signing of the Montreux Convention, the Italian press described it as "unrealistic" because it took "no account of the dynamism in European politics" and as valueless since it lacked the signature of one of the powers most directly affected.(39) The Italian Government was not only bitter about the matter because of its injured prestige, but it disliked increased Soviet influence which might counterbalance its own in the eastern Mediter-

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36. Ibid., p.664

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Turkey, feeling secure in its friendships with the Soviet Union and Great Britain and its own strength decided not to press the matter. Turkey could, also, always discriminate against Italian commercial ships if she insisted on warship rights under the old regime. The President of the Turkish Cabinet remarked at the beginning of August: "those who have a policy of international peace at heart will have profit from collaboration with us. Those who expect a different policy from us will be disappointed."(40)

In a short time, Italy had realized the weakness of her position and decided to cultivate Turkish friendship. At the end of July, she informed Turkey, Greece, and Jugoslavia of her peaceful intentions in the eastern Mediterranean and informed Turkey that she still considered herself bound by the Turco-Italian Pact of 1928. Friendly feelings were encouraged when the Turkish representative was the first to be removed from Addis Ababa without waiting for a decision from Geneva. A dispute between the two powers over the passage of two Spanish ships was not nearly so serious as it might have been. By the end of January, 1937, the Italian press announced that direct conversations would take place on the iniative of Turkey and made it clear that adherence would come about only on two conditions, first, that no discrimination be made against Italy for being a

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late-comer, and, secondly, that any decision which might have to be referred to the League Council under Article 21 of the Covenant would also be referred to the Italian Government in view of her de facto absence from Geneva. On February 2 and 3, 1937, a meeting was held between Count Ciano and M. Aras. According to the Italian press, Italy definitely wanted concessions and also was concerned with the Straits regime only in so far as it affected Turkey and not with the Montreux Convention as a whole. The conversations were said to be only a"preface".(41) No agreements were officially made at that time. It was not until May 2, 1938, after Turkey had given de facto recognition of Italy's annexation of Ethiopia that Italy finally signed the Montreux Convention.

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41. Ibid., p.650

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41. Ibid., p.880

CHAPTER V

THE STRAITS DURING WORLD WAR II

As far as the Straits were concerned, the period from the Montreux Convention to the beginning of the Second World War was a calm one. In February, 1937, the Turkish Government had announced a special increase of about twenty million dollars in Turksih military estimates to be devoted to refortification and also the placing of a fifteen million dollar contract with an English firm for the erection of steel-works in northern Turkey. From then on, Turkey was busy building a carefully planned network of defense and attack positions; modern defenses were built on both sides of the Straits, while roads were built in the neighboring areas to permit the rushing up of heavy artillery as fast as possible. Large quantities of mines were prepared for any emergency.

In Turkey as a whole, an intensive process of nationalization was still going on. Foreigners, especially Germans, became more and more umpopular. German spies were arrested; German professors in Turkish schools were dismissed. Turkey's relations with Britain and the Soviet Union were even friendlier than before. In the early part of 1939, Turkey had great hopes for further cooperation among her friends. An Anglo-French treaty with Russia was being contemplated, and the Soviet Union approved of a Turco-British treaty. On May 12, Mr. Chamberlain announced that a treaty of mutual aid and assistance was going to be drawn up soon between Turkey and Britain. On June 23, the French and Turkish governments issued a joint statement to the same effect

between them. Germany watched this growing friendship with apprehension. On August 24, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Germany to the astonishment of the Turkish government; in September, the Soviet Union attacked Finland. The Turkish people had always felt close to the Finns, and looked on the Soviet attack as almost a betrayal of themselves.

However, since it wished to have a free field of action in the Balkans, the Soviet Government was still anxious to retain its firendly relations with Turkey. In September, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Shukru Saracoglu, was invited to Moscow; Turkey hoped that the non-aggression pact between Turkey and the Soviet Union, to stabilize the balance of power in the Black Sea, might still be signed. Stalin tried to get Saracoglu to agree not to apply Article 19 if the Soviet Union should be the "aggressor" and to keep the Straits closed to warships hostile to her. Saracoglu replied that Turkey had the best will in the world to oblige the Soviet Union, but that she had been appointed guardian of the Straits by all the signatories of the Convention and could not undertake to favor one at the expense of the others. Negotiations broke down on October 17, with hopes expressed on both sides of future more fruitful conversations.

This blow did not, however, prevent Turkey, in fact probably encouraged her to, from signing a treaty of mutual assistance on October 19 with Great Britain and France. Article 2 (1) reads: "In the event of an act of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United

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Kingdom and will lend her all aid and assistance in her power."[1] Article 2 (2) read the same but with the names interchanged. However, Turkey was not going to risk alienating the Soviet Union: Protocol 2 read that "the obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union."[2] Articles 4 and 5 provide for consultation in case of aggression not specifically involving active participation and secure for Great Britain and France at least Turkey's benevolent neutrality in case of aggression against either of the two states.

The treaty made a bad impression in both Moscow and Berlin. Neither would believe that it was not directed at a particular state. Soviet and Turkish relations became colder; the Germans were not at all adverse to helping this feeling along. German sources spread tales of Russian designs on India and of Turkish plans to destroy the oil-wells at Baku. They even went so far as to hint that the terrible earthquake, which occurred in eastern Asia Minor at the end of 1939 was a result of divine wrath at Turkish abandonment of her former ally, Germany.

Up until 1944, Turkey adhered to the Montreux Convention to the best of her ability although there were complaints on both sides, of a fairly minor nature. The Straits, in accordance with Article 19, were closed to warships of belligerents. From

1. James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak. Turkey at the Straits, New York, 1940, p.169
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September, 1939, to March, 1940, this worked a hardship on Britain and France,for the interference with Soviet-German trade in the Black Sea would have helped their cause considerably. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance obviously was not yet applicable as the war had not reached the Mediterranean area. With the entrance of Italy on the side of Germany in June, 1940, just as France was on the verge of collapse, the war came, although not actively, to the area. Turkey was not expected to, nor did she show any willingness to join Britain in her lone fight against the Axis.

In the fall of 1940, an event occurred, which has been revealed only since the end of the war, proving that the Soviet Union was still very much interested in gaining control of the Straits. On October 13, 1940, the Soviet Union was asked to sign the pact already signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. T Two secret protocols were to be drawn up, one dividing the British Empire among the four powers, the Soviet's being given a piece "to the South of the territory of the Soviet Republics in the direction of the Indian Ocean" and the other providing that Germany and Italy give the Soviet Union additional rights, but not bases, in the Straits.(3) However, Molotov said the Soviet Union would not sign the protocols unless: (1) The first protocol was amended to give the Soviet Union specifically "the area south of Baku and Batum in the direction of the Persian Gulf;" (2) the second protocol included "the granting of bases

3. Time, 48, December 23, 1946, p.26

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for the U.S.S.R.'s land and sea forces at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles;" (3) a protocol was added giving the Soviet Union special rights in Bulgaria.[4] The German government did not answer this until pressed to do so in January of 1941 and then said only "the German government adheres to those ideas proposed to Herr Molotov at the time of his visit to Berlin."[5] Soviet-German relations became worse after this and finally led to the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941. Germany had safeguarded her relations with Turkey by signing a non-aggression pact with her only a few days before she invaded the Soviet Union.

As war approached Turkish territory in 1941, there were several incidents and accusations. In the late spring, reports were circulated that Germany had asked Turkey for complete military control of the Straits, and Russia, being informed of the German demand, had proposed sharing control of the Straits, a proposition rejected by the Germans. The full details are not yet known, and this may merely be a garbled report of the proposed four pact. This would account for the hurried landings on the Greek Islands, according to London reports. It was a mystery where the German troops which landed on Samothrace and Lemnos came from. Some British authorities at the time believed they had come through the Straits on German merchantmen and had escaped detection by keeping below the hatches. In line with

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The Soviet Union, in her note of August, 1946, mentioned two incidents during the summer of 1941, as evidence of Turkey's negligence. One of these was the passage of the 37 ton vedette boat, Seefalke, "flying a commercial flag and not figuring in the yearbook of war fleets" on July 6, 1941.(6) "This boat was not armed and carried only a big buoy and a life-saving canoe. No indication was discovered that could have implied any use for war aims."(7) The Turkish claim is that the fault was not in Turkey's handling of the situation, but in the definition and tonnage requirements in the Montreux Convention itself. The second incident concerned the Italian tanker Tarvisio: "the Tarvisio crossed the Straits in June, 1941, as a merchant boat. Passage of the boat was called to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a fraudulent case seeing that the ship in question figured also on the list of auxiliary ships of the

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Concerning her obligations under the Mutual Assistance Treaty, Turkey had done nothing; "in the summer of 1941, Turkey informed Germany that she would not grant unopposed passage to German troops, and when the German offensive did not come off, her cynical statesmen credited Turkish neutrality alone with having protected British interests in the Near and Middle East."(11)

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During 1942 and 1943, no incidents in the Straits attracted the particular attention of either side. The Soviets did accuse the Turkish authorities in their notes of August, 1946, of permitting questionable German commercial shipping through the Straits in November and December of 1942. However, the Turkish government retorted that "no German commercial ships went through the Straits in November and December, 1942, as it is claimed."(12) It went on to say that "between January 1, 1943 and January 1, 1944, only ten commercial ships of 19, 476 total tonnage and whose commercial status was observed definitely by authorities concerned, passed through the Straits for the Black Sea."(13)

However, although the Straits regime was running smoothly, Turkey itself was growing closer and closer to active cooperation with the Allies. While Anglo-Turkish negotiations were proceeding in September, 1943, the Soviet Journal launched an attack on Turkey for her neutrality, accusing her of"benevolent neutrality toward Germany, of thereby ensuring the safety of Germany's Balkan flank,"and stating that"if Turkey had not been neutral, Germany could notchave fought on the Soviet front."(14) The reason for this attack, which did, as hoped, embarrass Great Britain, was Soviet alarm over the close collaboration between

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In the fall of 1943, before the Teheran Conference, Germany sounded the Soviet Union out on making a separate peace. The latter gave Germany the impression she would sign one if Germany would agree to: "(1) recognition of Soviet annexation of the Baltic states; (2) Russian control of the Dardanelles; (3) Russian expansion south and east to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea; (4) German support of Soviet demands for control of Dairen in Manchuria."[15] Germany refused to agree to such Russian control of the Middle East.

The Soviet Union, undaunted in her desires, decided to press the Allies. It is reported that she unofficially made it clear to Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran in November that she wanted access to the Straits as one of the rewards for her long fight against Germany. This conference, from a realistic point of view, merely set up spheres of interest, and Turkey fell under the Soviet one. At discussions held after Teheran, the Turkish president asked Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt if they were willing to guarantee Turkish independence against the

15. Time, vol.48, December 23, 1946, p.26

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15. Time, vol. 42, December 25, 1944, p. 28

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1944 saw the growing annoyance of Great Britain and the Soviet Union with Turkey, still adamant in her decision to maintain the Montreux Convention and show no partiality, even after Italy's defeat. In March, Turkey refused to permit ex-Italian fleet units to join the Soviet fleet units in the Black Sea, a move which would not only have restored complete control of the Black Sea to the Soviet Union, but would have placed her in a position potentially strong enough to launch a land and amphibious campaign against the Balkans, especially Rumania. As it was, the Soviet fleet had suffered heavy losses from German air attacks while, on the other hand, a few German submarines had been shipped down the Danube,and Rumanian monitors, gunboats, and some altered transport craft had given the enemy a small navy in the Black Sea.

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In August, 1944, Turkey severed relations with Germany, and the Allies began to feel that perhaps they could make full use of the Straits. However, they did not have it until after January, 1945, when the German air bases in the Ionian Sea and the Balkans were effectively neutralized. As a British commentator said, "there (was) really nothing political about it. It (was) purely a military matter which had been solved by a change in military events."(20) The necessity of cleaning up the mine fields delayed the immediate and complete use of the Straits. Since the Allies had no further use of the supply line through Iran, built to take the place of a route through the Straits, the route closed down. On February 23, 1945, Turkey finally declared war on Germany and Japan. Actually there was little gained from this except for the increase in supplies, escorted by Allied warships, if needed. Apparently, Turkey declared war officially chiefly because she had been told such a course was necessary for her full participation in the coming San Francisco Conference.

In conclusion, the Montreux Convention was observed with very minor exceptions by all the powers having occasion to use the Straits, including non-signatory as well as signatory powers. However, the restraint of the two sides was not one due to ethics. As mentioned before, the Straits were closed to Britain and France in 1939 and 1940, when they might have stopped German-Russo commercial shipping if they had been able to send warships

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into the Black Sea; however, the Allies did not wish to chance driving Turkey to war on the side of the Axis. After the end of the Soviet-Finnish struggle and the French surrender, the war area was not near the Straits until the spring of 1941. Then, German forces began to arrive simultaneously on the coasts of the Black Sea and the Aegean. Germany was so well-supplied with land communications for her operations in the Balkans and in South Russia it was not necessary for her to call on her meagre naval and mercantile resources to transfer men or materials from one sea to another. In addition, she still did not wish to "precipitate Turkey prematurely into the arms of the Allies by attempting to force" a passage through the Straits.(21) On the other hand, although the Allies were in great need of a passage through the Straits to help the Soviet Union, German control in the area was too effective, and an alternative route through Persia had to be laid out. At no time were the Straits necessary as an active line of attack, since the Soviet Union was not at war with a major Mediterranean power; Italy had limited naval resources, and what resources there were were held in check elsewhere.

In accordance with the last paragraph, Turkey's problem was never one of actual defense of the Straits, but merely one of proper and fair regulation of the passage of all ships on the basis of the Montreux Convention. This role she played well; Turkey herself said she "filled the role of guardian of the Straits

21. "Russia, Turkey, and the Straits," The World Today, vol.11, no.9 September, 1946, p.398

into the Black Sea; however, the Allies did not wish to change driving Turkey to war on the side of the Axis. After the end of the Soviet-Finnish struggle and the French surrender, the war area was not near the Straits until the spring of 1941. Then, German forces began to arrive simultaneously on the coasts of the Black Sea and the Aegean. Germany was so well-supplied with land communications for her operations in the Balkans and in South Russia it was not necessary for her to call on her meagre naval and mercantile resources to transfer men or materiale from one sea to another. In addition, she still did not wish to "precipitate Turkey prematurely into the arms of the Allies by attempting to force" a passage through the Straits.[21] On the other hand, although the Allies were in great need of a passage through the Straits to help the Soviet Union, German control in the area was too effective, and an alternative route through Persia had to be laid out. At no time were the Straits necessary as an active line of attack, since the Soviet Union was not at war with a major Mediterranean power; Italy had limited naval resources, and what resources there were were held in reserve elsewhere.

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21. "Russia, Turkey, and the Straits," The World Today, vol. 11, no. 9, September, 1944, p. 394

bequeathed to it by history" with "a correctness pushed sometimes to fanaticism that even disdained the proper interests of Turkey."(22) Moreover, since the "watch kept by Turkish authorities on transit ships through the Straits was complicated by the fact that the only kind of control that the ships could be submitted to, according to the convention, was a sanitary control effected 'during the day and the night' with the most possible speed,"it would have been easy to make more minor errors than Turkey did..(23) Turkey went on to say that any complaints about the Straits regime should not be aimed at "the intrinsic dispositions which regulate the properly legal aspect of the regime...but rather at the definition of warships, their specifications as well as the tonnage, which form the purely technical appendix of the convention."(24)

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22. New York Times, August 25, 1946, p.12

23. Loc. cit.

24. Loc. cit.

CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II

Even though the Soviet Union started her campaign on the control of the Straits in the spring of 1945, while the war was still going on, her objectives were all post-war and were slowly related to post-war developments than to the war itself. At the Yalta Conference in February, where post-war policies toward Germany, Poland, and Yugoslavia were discussed, the Soviet Union informed the British and French governments that she wished a revision of the Montreux Convention. Britain had also regained her interest in revision, but along the lines of internationalization, since her position in Greece and the Aegean Sea had been reinforced. No positive move was taken at the Conference, but the Allies were said to have agreed that somewhere should take place.

On March 20, the Soviet Union denounced the Russo-Turkish treaty of friendship which the two had signed in 1925 and which was to come up for renewal in November. The Soviet Union wished to make some positive alliance from which she could gain the concessions on the Straits question she wanted. In June, she demanded that "prior to any international discussion of the revision of the obsolete Montreux Convention governing the control and administration of the Black Sea Straits, the Turkish government should agree to grant the U.S.S.R. rights to strategic defensive bases in the Straits area...the exact nature or location of the bases was not specified."[1] Certain French scholars thought

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Turkey, quite naturally, was annoyed by these demands. She kept Britain informed of all negotiations through normal diplomatic channels, and one writer says "therefore it may be assumed that Russia's reuqests were directed at much at Britain as much as at Turkey."(5)

The Soviet Union made other suggestions during this period also; the Ankara radio reported she had proposed another treaty which would close the Straits to the warships of all foreign powers

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2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
4. A.J.Fisher, "The Dardanelles," The Central European Observer, August 30, 1946, p.271
5. Heinz Eulau, "Turkey and the Straits," New Republic, vol.113, July 23, 1945, p.100

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except Turkey and the Soviet Union. She also hinted later on at the possibility of settlement by bilateral agreement to which the British answered, "this is one of several problems affecting the destinies of the Middle East which are ripe for preliminary discussion by the Three Powers in common in preparation for their joint discussion with the other countries directly affected. ..Such consultation would not only have the advantage of eliminating the misunderstanding likely to arise from the isolated treatment of issues which may have repercussions reaching far beyond their nominal scope and content;...also prepare the way for common policies in a large and vital region of the world." (6) On August 4, Soviet-Turco discussions were halted; the Turkish government rejected flatly Soviet demands for territorial concessions and base privileges in the Straits area. She refused to discuss the problem any further while the Soviet Union still had such concessions in mind.

It was inevitable, then, that the question of the Straits should be brought up by the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Conference in August. It was reported that the Straits problem became rather critical during the conference. The Soviet Union demanded control of the Straits defenses. Britain refused outright, while the United States presented as a compromise a proposal for international control which would protect free navigation and not impair Turkish sovereignty.

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6. New York Times, July 24, 1945, p.11

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At the meeting of the Big Three in Berlin during October, it was agreed to split the Dardanelles question from the question of the Danube, the Elbe, and other waterways of Europe. The United States, still working on its project of internationalizing the waterways,had suggested that all such water routes except the Dardanelles be internationalized, but this too had been refused. The decision on the Dardanelles was that each power

7. Harry N.Howard,"Some Recent Developmentsin the Problem of the Turkish Straits:1945-46,"Dept. of State Bul.,vol.XVI,No.395,p.143

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7. Harry S. Howard, "Some Recent Developments in the Problem of the Turkish Straits:1945-46," Dept. of State Bul., vol.XVI, No.403, p.145

approach Turkey on the matter separately through diplomatic channels with its own proposals.

The British and American governments were reported to be working together on a common opinion toward the issue. On November 2, without consultation with the British on the final draft, the United States presented Turkey with its proposals: "(1) The Straits to be opened to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times; (2) The Straits to be opened to the transit of the warships of Black Sea powers at all times except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers, or except when acting under the authority of the U.N.; (4) Certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the U.N. organization for the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory."(8) Substantially, these proposals were little changed from the provisions of the Montreux Convention.

The British government sent a note to Turkey on November 21, not setting out any particular proposals but stating its willingness to take part in any international conference to consider revision of the Montreux Convention and also its desire to reserve it exact point of view until then. It added that the matter did not seem urgent to the British government. It was also reported that the British government, while agreeing with the American note in principle, actually was not willing to admit the exclusion of the Royal Navy.

8. New York Times, November 8, 1945, p.2

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5. New York Times, November 8, 1945, p.8

On December 6, 1945, the Turkish government answered the American note, accepting it as the basis for any discussion of revision. No word had been received from the Soviet Union since the Turkish government had refused to consider Soviet demands in August.

The United States battleship Missouri paid a courtesy visit to Istanbul when it brought home the Turkish envoy in April, 1946. This visit is thought to have been made chiefly to show the Soviet Union our serious intent to protect the integrity of Turkey and other parts of the Middle East. The U.S.S.R. made no more demands on the Straits until August, 1946, and the center of interest shifted from the Straits to the Transcausian frontier of Turkey and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the anti-Turkish campaign, which had been going on in the Soviet press and on the radio since March of 1945, continued in full force, including a particularly violent attack on the Turkish elections in July.

On August 7, 1946, the next to the last day on which a signatory of the Montreux Convention could demand a revision of it, the Soviet Union sent a note to Turkey; copies were also sent to London and Washington. It complained, first, that "events during the war showed clearly that the regime of the Black Sea Straits established by the Montreux in 1936 does not correspond to the interests of security of the Black Sea powers and does not safeguard conditions that would prevent the use of these Straits for hostile ends against the Powers."[9] The first three

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Soviet suggestions were similar to the American ones, which could hardly have been more liberal to Soviet aims without giving control directly to the Soviet Union. The fourth proposal was that "the establishment of the regime of the Straits as the only seaway leading from the Black Sea and into the Black Sea must be decided by the Turks and the other Black Sea powers."(10) The fifth proposal went even further in pointing out that "Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the most interested powers, must organise jointly the defence of the Straits for the prevention of their use by other powers with inimical aims to the Black Sea powers."(11) The Soviet Union, then, had abandoned her direct demand for bases on the Straits and tried to gain her objective by close collaboration with and, she no doubt hoped, a virtual protectorate over her friend, Turkey. Her demands would prevent international regulation and would not even permit the non-Black Sea powers to take part in revision conferences.

As might be expected, the Soviet note created a tense situation. The Turkish Foreign Minister reminded the world of the British-Turkish alliance of 1939, which was "still the foundation of Ankara's foreign policy."(12) He said that he was agreeable to far-reaching revisions of the Straits regime, but "would leave no stone unturned to prevent limitations of her jealously defended sovereignty."(13) It was pointed out that one million men or one-eighth of the male population of Turkey was in uniform,

10. Loc. cit. 11. Loc. cit.

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The other powers concerned were hardly less upset by the new Soviet note. In London, "the form of the Russian demand for a new Dardanelles regime (was) regarded...as little less than a diplomatic atom bomb."(15) London interpreted the demands to mean that the Soviet government was not willing to accept the idea of revision of the Montreux Convention by its signatories, minus Japan and plus the United States, but that the Soviet Union intended to settle the whole question with Turkey bilaterally. Britain felt that the procedure of revision as laid down in the

14. New York Times, August 15, 1946, p.3

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Montreux Convention must be adhered to; the British government would certainly back Turkish opposition to territorial concessions. Britain was aware of her own somewhat similar position in regard to the Suez Canal and said she would try to find some sort of compromise that would satisfy Soviet security claims.

In the United States, one editorial writer said:

> "people whose job it is to study Soviet Foreign policy and to follow closely the development of tension between Russia and the West are far more worried about the issues raised by Moscow's latest move in Turkey than they are by verbal clashes at the Paris Peace Conference. There is a definite feeling that if the Russians press their demands for a new Dardanelles statute along the lines of their latest note to Ankara, and especially if they attempt to force their views on the Turkish government, then Turkey might well become the Poland of the next war. Or...she might...play the role of Czechoslovakia. That is, if the Turksih government does not feel itself strongly backed not only diplomatically but if necessary, militarily by Britain and the United States, then the Turks, like the Czechs in the face of Hitler's 'nerve war' might give in. But if so, it would only be the prelude to conflict at Soviet Russia's next security demand, as Czech's loss was followed by Poland's resistance and by the outbreak of the war." (16)

Other and more official attitudes toward the Soviet note may not have been as drastic as this writer's, but it is certain that the general feeling was one of alarm and pessimism.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was equally convinced of the rightness of its demands. The Soviets interpreted the agreement at Potsdam to mean that each power confer separately with Turkey about the Straits as authorization to go ahead and negotiate directly and bilaterally. Britain and the United

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However, in the two or three weeks before the American note to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union changed her tactics slightly; the government-controlled sources began to make accusations against the United States and Britain for obstructing peace efforts and preparing for a new war. She commented favorably on British troops in Basra and the sending of British and Indian troops into Abadan. Atthe same time, her broadcasts on the Straits question were distinctly conciliatory and failed to emphasize a bilateral settlement or smention her former demand for bases. In London and Washington, it was suspected that the Soviet Union was "using radio as a big stick...while hinting at

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her readiness to settle the Dardanelles issue by revision."[18] The trend was toward "less menace and more propaganda to steady her own position;" her radio attacks on Turkey were somewhat muted for the time being.[19]

The American government sent its official answer to the Soviet government stating its exact attitude toward Soviet demands. First, Turkey should continue to shoulder the primary responsibility toward the Straits; the Russian proposal to share control of the Dardanelles with Turkey ignored the existence of the U.N.O. If the Straits were attacked, the situation would clearly be a threat to international scurity and be the cause for action by the U.N.Security Council. Therefore, it was not necessary for the Soviet Union to share control with Turkey for the proper protection of her security. The Soviet suggestion was not a plan for revision but an entirely new Straits regime. "The position of the Government of the United States is that the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the U.N. and should function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the U.N."[20] A State Department official said that "Russian insistence on her position would be regarded as a grave matter with serious potentialities."[21] He further interpreted the "Russian scheme as having broader implications than the mere desire for land defenses along the

18. New York Times, August 20, 1946, p.6 19. Loc. cit.

20. New York Times, August 22, 1946, p.3

21. New York Times, August 22, 1946, p.1

her readiness to settle the Dardanelles issue by revision.[18] The trend was toward "less menace and more propaganda to steady her own position;" her radio attacks on Turkey were somewhat muted for the time being.[19]

The American government sent its official answer to the Soviet government stating its exact attitude toward Soviet demands. First, Turkey should continue to shoulder the primary responsibility toward the straits; the Russian proposal to share control of the Dardanelles with Turkey ignored the existence of the U.N.O. If the Straits were attacked, the situation would clearly be a threat to international security and be the cause for action by the U.N.Security Council. Therefore, it was not necessary for the Soviet Union to share control with Turkey for the proper protection of her security. The Soviet suggestion was not a plan for revision but an entirely new Straits regime. "The position of the Government of the United States is that the regime of the straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the U.N. and should function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the U.N."[20] A state Department official said that "Russian insistence on her position would be regarded as a grave matter with serious potentialities."[21] He further interpreted the "Russian scheme as having broader implications than the mere desire for land aggrandizement along the

18. New York Times, August 20, 1946, p.6 19. Ibid. cit.

20. New York Times, August 22, 1946, p.3

21. New York Times, August 22, 1946, p.1

gateway to the Black Sea.., more plausible motive in Turkey's position as an unfriendly nation on Russian idea of her defense perimeter."(22)

This wholehearted support of Turkey's right to control the Straits was greeted with enthusiaism in Turkey. Turkish sources reported that there had been little doubt of Britain's support, but there had been some question as to how far the United States would go. A Turkish spokesman stated "intervention by America in this question removes Russian threat from Turkey. We accept with our eyes shut all that America proposes. We have complete confidence in the United States and her political concepts."(23) The Soviet reaction to the American note was as might have been expected. The Daily Worker, a Communist organ, reported: "The State Department continued its 'big stick' campaign against the European democracies and the Soviet Union yesterday with a blunt note rejecting proposals for joint Russo-Turkish control of the Dardanelles...the State Department was clearly engaged in a big attempt to pressure Europe, to show off its strength at Paris and panic the American into a war fever."(24)

The Turkish stand was further strengthened by the British note to the Soviet Union , sent on August 21. The general principles were same as those stated in the American note, and the wording of the note was even firmer than that of the American one. "It has for long been internationally recognized that the

22. Loc. cit. 23. New York Times, August 23,1946,p.6
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regime of the Straits is the concern of other states besides the Black Sea powers. His Majesty's government cannot, therefore, agree with the Soviet view that the future regime should be the concern of the Black Sea powers alone."[25] The Turks were relieved by these two notes for they felt that the problem was no longer merely a Turkish one, but had become a British and American concern as well.

Britain, too, was cheered by the firm American stand; "the United States, assuming the historic role of British diplomacy, has taken the lead in opposing the Russian demand for control of the Straits," London reported.[26] There was"a growing conviction in London that the United States intervention may prove decisive not only in the important issues of the Dardanelles and Trieste, but also on the basic problem of relations with the Soviet Union."[27] The Dardanelles note and the ultimatum to Tito demanding redress and satisfaction over the capture and killing of the American airmen were "regarded in Britain as introducing a new element in the diplomatic situation just when and where it was most needed."[28]

On August 22, confident in British-American support, Turkey sent a long note in answer to the Soviet proposals. She defended herself from Soviet accusations of negligence and partisan treatment of the Axis in her regime of the Straits during the war. Turkey maintained that "not a single time during

25. New York Times, November 22, 1946, p.14
26. New York Times, August 25, 1946, IV, p.5
27. Loc. cit.
28. Loc. cit.

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World War II did the Soviet Government catch the Turkish Republic with a situation that would put the security of the Black Sea in danger."[29] She stated that she had always applied the stipulations of the Montreux Convention conscientiously, and that any fault was due to some of the admittedly obsolete technical parts of the Convention, but "it(could not) admit that these faults, condemned to remain isolated cases, should serve as motives for the rejection in its whole of a convention that reveals itself an instrument of equilibrium."[30] Moreover, to suggest changing the present form of defense of the Straits would be "to deny the existence and aims of the U.N. Charter" and to show the U.N. a distrust which the Turkish government did not "understand."[31] If the Soviet Union feared aggression, it could "refer to the efficacy of the U.N., to which Turkey remain(ed) firmly attached."[32] "The most sure guarantee for security of the Soviet Union in the Black Sea resides not in the search of a privileged strategical position in the Straits--a position incompatible with the dignity and sovereign rights of an independent country--but in the restoration of friendly, trusting relations with a strong Turkey which is decided to use all her forces to inaugurate this happy era, but whose efforts in this cause need to be seconded by an equal good-will coming from its northern neighbor."[33] Turkey wanted to be certain that in any conference of the future one of her main supporters would be present so she stated that "as for

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29. New York Times, August 25, 1946, p.12 30. Loc. cit.
31. Loc. cit. 32. Loc. cit. 33. Loc. cit.

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participation of the United States in the proposed conference, the Turkish government considers this not only as a realization of a warm hope, but also as an imperative necessity."(34)

The attitude of the Turkish government to any Russian attempts to absorb Turkey in her orbit had been made clear to the Soviet Union, and, there was nothing hidden about the support of America and Britain in this view. As Time so aptly put it, "sinking back on their timely political cushion, (the Turks) pulled on their hookahs and gazed Moscowards with an expression that plainly said: 'Your move.'"(35) Foreshadowing did appear in a Turkish newspaper: "rejecting the Russian proposals is insufficient. The Soviet Union must be told to withdraw from everywhere it has entered without right. Our answer won't satisfy Russia for Moscow hates the international regime, which we are ready to improve on, if necessary."(36)

For a month, the Soviet Union sent no official notes concerning the Straits; she was momentarily silenced. Her radio propaganda continued as usual, against Britain particularly. The Soviet press charged that Britain had set up military installations in the Dardanelles area, and even worse, "according to reports available in Beirut, the British military adviser and instructor at a radar station stated that he would resign unless he was placed directly in charge of the station. The Turks complied with his demand and appointed him chief of the station,

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34. Loc. cit. 35. Time, vol.48, September 2, 1946, p.22
36. New York Times, August 26, 1946, p.1

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34. Loc. cit. 35. Time, vol.46, September 2, 1946, p.22
36. New York Times, August 26, 1946, p.1

with a Turkish officer attached to him as an assistant."[37] In answer to the first accusation, the British replied that perhaps thet referred to radar which they "presumed our troops in Greece are using as most armies do."[38] Further accusations were called "provocative fabrications;" "we have established no supply base, nor have we taken over any airfields, although we have supplied the Turkish with radar equipment. We have also sent over technicians to demonstrate the workings of the apparatus. But we have done so with several other countries."[39]

On September 24, another Soviet note was handed to the Turkish Foreign Minster replying to the earlier Turkish note. It contained a warning to Turkey that if she began organizing "military measures in the Straits together with any non-Black Sea power," it would be considered by the Soviet Union as "contradicting directly" the interests of security of the other Black Sea states.[40] The Soviet Union complained that the Turkish government turned down"whole-sale" all possibilities of studying the problem with the Soviet government, that such an attitude "clearly contradicts" Turkish protestations of friendship toward Russia, and that the Turkish assertion that joint defense of the Straits is incompatible with Turkish sovereignty is an entirely unfounded suspicion, viewed as "incompatible with the dignity of the Soviet Union."[41]

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37. Loc. cit. 38. Loc. cit.

39. New York Times, August 27, 1946, p.3

40. New York Times, September, 29, 1946, p.1 41. Loc. cit.

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37. Loc. cit. 38. Loc. cit.

39. New York Times, August 27, 1946, p.8

40. New York Times, September, 29, 1946, p.1 41. Loc. cit.

Nor was the Soviet government satisfied with Turkish explanations of minor violations of the Montreux Convention; these explanations, said the Soviet note, do not "release the Turkish government from the responsibility it bears for the violation of control of the Straits that took place during the war."(42) Moreover, Turkish reference to the steps Turkey had taken at British insistence in 1944 "only confirms the justice of the Soviet statement that the Montreux Convention had not prevented the Straits from being used by enemy powers against the Allies states."(43) Turkey's attention was also drawn to the Black Sea's being a "closedsea", therefore making the function of the Dardanelles "entirely different" from those of the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal.(44) In this case, "it would be just to establish a regime in the Straits that would above all, correspond to the special situation and the security of Turkey, the U.S.S.R. and other Black Sea powers."(45) Also, said the Soviet note firmly, this proposal "by no means" contradicts the interests of other nations in strengthening universal peace and the security of nations; the Soviet government "holds the opinion that it is only by mutual means that Turkey and the Soviet Union can guarantee the freedom of commercial navigation and the security of the Straits."(46) Joint defense of the Straits

42. Loc. cit. 43. Loc. cit. 44. Loc.cit. -- a"closed sea" as opposed to an "open sea" is, in international law, a land-locked or nearly land-locked sea, and presents no question of right of passage by a third state--C. Fenwick, International Law, p.295.
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45. Loc. cit.

46. Loc. cit.

would safeguard them to a greater degree than an exclusively Turkish defense.

The second note came as a surprise since all concerned thought their last notes sufficiently positive to stop any further demands of the same nature. However, the Soviet Union did not send this note to Britain and the United States as she had her first one, and had thus prejudiced "in advance their right to participate in the talks for the revision of the treaties."(47) Turkey, however, because she considered the two powers properly a party to any such negotiations kept them informed. Within Turkey itself, moderate political circles considered the Soviet note a mild one and a possible basis for future bargaining and discussions. The more general attitude was expressed in the newspaper Ulus; "it really is incomprehensible that Russia should take offense because we do not want to cede bases or our territory...We hope our new answer will make it understood that this subject cannot become the theme of an exchange of correspondence."(48) The Turkish press published its usual reports of Russia's fortifying her Black Sea areas and planning to attack Turkey at any moment; although the Turkish army was not actually "alert", it was prepared for any emergency.

The United States was also displeased by the new Soviet proposals; on September 31, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal issued a formal statement, undoubtedly aimed at the Soviet Union,

47. New York Times, August 18, 1946, p.10

48. New York Times, Ocotber 3, 1946, p.18

that units of the United States Navy were then in the Mediterranean and would remain there to support the Allied occupation policy in Europe and "to protect United States' interests and United States' policies in the area."[49] On the same afternoon, a State Department statement was made which did not have the precision of Foreestal's but did indicate that we had a definite interests in conditions in the Mediterranean. However, two days later, Dean Acheson tried to calm public opinion by saying that he saw nothing unusual in their being American forces in the Mediterranean to support American foreign policy, and that there was a "lot of unnecessary excitement."[50] The Secretary of State was not quite so unconcerned: "it would be folly to deny the seriousness of the conflict in viewpoints among the Allies...I concur most heartily in the view recently expressed by Generalissimo Stalin that there is no immediate danger of war...The difficulty is that, while no nation wants war, nations may pursue policies or courses of action which lead to war."[51]

On October 9, both the British and American governments sent sharp notes to the Soviet government. Said the British note; "the Potsdam Agreement laid it down as the next step this matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish government. But it is the view of my government that this 'next step' has been completed by the exchange of views which have now taken place

49. New York Times, October 6, 1946, p.5, IV
50. New York Times, October 2, 1946, p.14
51. New York Times, October 6, 1946, IV, p.1

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49. New York Times, October 6, 1946, p.5, IV
50. New York Times, October 9, 1946, p.14
51. New York Times, October 8, 1946, IV, p.1

between these governments. My governments therefore see no need for or purpose in continuing direct correspondence on the subject."(52) However, Britain was still ready for a conference of a sort following the provisions of the Montreux Convention.

The United States note reiterated its views of August 19; copies were sent to France, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. It was, of course, hoped that the note would serve as a preventive measure before the Soviet Union precipitated any positive action toward gaining control of the Straits. Potsdam, it stated, should not "have the effect of prejudicing the participation of the other two signatory powers in the revision"of the Montreux Convention; diplomatic correspondence should merely be "a useful preliminary to a conference of all of the interested powers."(53) Finally, the American government stated that it felt "it would be lacking in frankness if it should fail to point out again this time, in the most friendly spirit, that in its opinion the government of Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits and that should the Straits become the object of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the U.N."(54)

The Turkish government was glad to see that her backers were still supporting her. The only doubt about the American note seemed to be whether action by the U.N. Security Council

52. New York Times, November 22, 1946, p.14
53. New York Times, October 12, 1946, p.3
54. Loc. cit.

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52. New York Times, November 24, 1946, p.14
53. New York Times, October 12, 1946, p.8
54. Loc. cit.

in case of aggression would be fast and efficient enough. On October 18, the Turks answered the Soviet note, in words making it clear that, as far as it was concerned, all preliminary discussions concerning the Dardanelles had been completed. It retorted on the supposed threat to Soviet security during the war that the "real threat to the security of the Black Sea shores came from the occupation of a large part of the shore of that sea by the German armies, from the German possession of the Rumanian and Bulgarian fleets and from the presence of German and Italian ships sent to the Black Sea ports by rail or through the Danube."(55) As to cooperation among the Black Sea powers, Turkey said it had "a clear perception of her quality as a Black Sea power, but she (could not) forget that she is a Mediterranean country, too. Having a particularly sensitive geographic situation in assuring liaison between the two worlds separated by the restricted space of the Straits, she is conscious of the obligations which this situation imposes upon her in regard to the two seas which wash her shores...The Turkish government (could not) therefore, consider the question of the Black Sea and the Straits as a problem interesting only Black Sea powers."(56)

In answer to the Soviet warning about outside help, Turkey stated that "the very definite attitude which the Turkish government ahs taken on the matter is not a gamble on any hypothetical foreign support..Turkey feels herself strong and united and could

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55. New York Times, October 21, 1946, p.15 56. Loc. cit.

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The Soviet Union was disappointed and bitter about the failure of her second note to entice Turkey into closer collaboration with its government. The Soviet press felt that the Turkish reply was the result of "extremely crooked, secret negotiations between Turkish and American diplomats," that the "intrigue" was a "crying contradiction" to the "pathetic statements of the Turkish press that Turkey is fully independent and deciding her own policy...We have heard about dollar diplomacy and of dollar diplomacy, but hasn't the 'geography of the dollar' now appeared on God's earth with a new distribution of land and sea."[61]

57. Loc. cit. 58. Loc. cit. 59. Loc. cit.
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In a speech to the United Nations in late October, the Turkish representative, although not mentioning the Straits specifically, defied the Soviet Union on the issue in a veiled way: "army and military might are powerful weapons, but the force of world opinion is far more potent."[62] He then added his wish that the field of application for the veto power be, if not eliminated, at least limited. Turkey, fearing Soviet intentions, was putting her complete trust in the United Nations.

In November, the issue was closed for the time being by the Soviet answer to the British note of October 9. It was understood to have offered little hope that any conference would be held soon, and that, even if it were, any agreement satisfactory to the Soviet Union could be reached.

Since the Soviet note, there has been no formal mention of the Dardanelles, but each side has obviously become more determined. The "Truman doctrine" of the spring of 1947, by which the United States threatens to back up its moral support of Turkey with financial aid, has made it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States is not bluffing and will not draw back into its isolationist shell if threatened. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has not forgotten her aims; the problem is still unsolved.

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62. New York Times, October 27, 1946, p.1

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69. New York Times, October 27, 1946, p.1

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Today everyone agrees that the Montreux Convention is in need of revision. The League of Nations has disappeared, and Japan should be released from any responsibility as a signatory power. It is obsolete in that there are no provisions for small vessels under 100 tons making up a large numerical proportion of a modern fleet, in that no account is taken of the possibility of effective closure by sea and air of the approaches to the Straits, and that the political situation in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea is different from what it was in 1936.

The problem of the Straits is basically the same today as it was in 1936, although the specific points of disagreement are of a different nature. In 1936, Britain, opposing the Soviet Union as Britain and the United States are now, did not want non-Black Sea warships excluded from the Straits or even limited in number. In 1946, the Western powers are willing to grant that limitation of the number of non-Black Sea warships, coupled with practically free passage of the warships of Black Sea powers, is a fair adjustment. However, the Soviet Union is no longer satisfied with this concession; she wants positive assurance that she will have control of the Straits in wartime by having bases herself in the Straits zone and by sharing control with Turkey.

Obviously, the United States and Great Britain will oppose such demands, perhaps even to the point of war. Already, the

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United States is threatening to put money behind its diplomatic cooperation with Turkey in an attempt to assure Turkey's holding to our democratic point of view and to warn the Soviet Union against forcing her demands on Turkey by diplomatic or military pressure. The satisfaction of Soviet aims would result in Turkey's becoming a Soviet satellite, they feel; according to the American and British view, this situation would be contrary to all the post-war ideals the Soviet Union had agreed to, including the principles of the United Nations Charter. Turkey's sovereignty must be maintained in spite of Soviet desires for security, and the United States and Britain fail to see why the United Nations and related separate agreements cannot satisfy the Soviet Union. As Bevin said, on June 4, 1946, in the House of Commons: "we will always welcome the mercantile fleet of the Soviet Union on all the seas of the world...we will sail to Odessa again, to the Black Sea and Constanza, quite freely, but we do not ask for a base or military requirements to enable us to do so... our aim is the free movement of shipping and the world's trade...whatever responsibilities we undertake in the defence scheme of the world in any particular area, we give a solemn undertaking that they will be on a basis of freedom to all members of the Peace Club on equal terms."(1)

The Soviet Union bases her right to control the Straits on a more fundamental justice than that of preservation of the status quo, she thinks. According to the Soviet Union, her posi-

1. Harry N.Howard,"Some Recent Developments in the Problem of the Turkish Straits:1945-46,"Dept. of State Bul. vol.XVI No. 395, January 26, 1947, p.146

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tion as the large power most in need of the free use of the Straits from the first consciousness of herself as a state, with obligations to increase her trade, protect her territory, and build her prestige among other nations, has never been sufficiently recognized. Turkey, all historians agree, was allowed to exist or rather forced to stay alive during the nineteenth century only because Briatin and France and other interested powers needed her as a protection against Russian seizure of the Straits. A Soviet newspaper raved the international conventions in the past had been "wholly directed against Russia and served as a policy for turning Turkey into a noose for strangling Russia."(2)

The Western powers have offered what they feel is adequate security for the Soviet Union, internationalization of the Straits. Neither the Soviet Union nor Turkey approves of such a change. Soviet writers counter by saying that the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez and the Panama Canals should also be put under international control. Henry Wallace,in his notorious letter, pointed out: "most of us are firmly convinced of the soundness of our position when we suggest the internationalization and defortification of the Danube and the Dardanelles, but we would be horrified and angered by any Russian counter-proposal that would involve also the internationalization and disarming of Suez or Panama. We must recignize that to the Russians these seem to be identical situations."(3) Indignant American writers try to

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show how different the Panama and the Dardanelles are; the United States built the Panama Canal to provide for quick passage from one side to the other of the United States, whereas the Dardanelles are a natural waterway not providing passageway from one part of the Soviet Union to the other; the United States has Panamanian permission and also an agreement of long standing, while Turkey is fighting Soviet plans and the Straits have for many years been controlled through an international convention; lastly, Turkey proved capable of defending the Straits during a war while Panama undoubtedly could not. Actually, the Straits are just as valuable to the Soviet Union even if they do not permit passage from one part of the country to another, at least not directly, for they are the only hope of direct entrance for her ships into the Mediterranean; the United States could go around South America or transport her goods by rail, a more direct route, anyway. As for Panamanian permission, this was gained in the last century through American intervention in the Panamanian revolution against Colombia; Russia would undoubtedly have had similar permission from Turkey long ago if other powers had not intervened. Finally, Turkey was not placed in a position during the second World War where she actually had to defend the Straits, and she obviously could not defend the Straits from a power like the Soviet Union unless other powers helped her. Until other similar waterways are put under international control, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will wholeheartedly agree to such a proposal.

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The attitude of the United States and Great Britain toward what would amount to Soviet control of the Straits is merely a slightly changed version of the Western powers' feeling in the nineteenth century. They do not want the Soviet Union to gain a strong foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, for in doing so the Soviet Union might "outflank the strategic lines of defense upon which the British depend throughout the Middle East."(4) Britain wants her lifeline secure, and that excludes Soviet domination of the area. To protect that lifeline, the Western powers are again ready to preserve Turkish sovereignty.

From a practical point of view, the solution to the problem of the Straits would be to grant the Soviet Union her bases and political control of the Straits. As an English writer says, "in time of peace, the regime obtaining is of so little importance that it may be questioned whether Turkey would be wise to insist too strongly on the letter of her sovereignty and raise the issue to the level of a major international dispute...in time of war, control of the Straits is clearly of vastly greater importance to Russia than to any other Power, and in the event of a war between her and any Mediterranean power it would seem that the zone could not escape becoming a battlefield whose control would go to the strongest...and it is highly unlikely that Turkey could remain neutral in such a war."(5)

A conference for revision of the Montreux Convention would

4. "Turkey:Russian Squeeze," Newsweek, 28:36, August 26, 1946
5. "Russia, Turkey, and the Straits," The World Today, vol.11, No. 9, p.404

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probably end in disagreement since each side is equally insistent. However, if some political agreement can be reached in regard to the whole area, actually unlikely, since the matter is so vital to the balance of power between the Western powers and Russia, the problem of the Dardanelles might be solved by voluntary giving in of one side or the other. No satisfactory, at least permanently satisfactory, compromise seems possible at the moment; the Soviet view is so completely different from the Allied view that there is no common stand to begin on. It seems probable that, by war or political compromise, the Soviet Union will gain the control she wishes. The most promising way to prevent this is through a really strong United Nations, to which the nations of the world will be willing to give up part of their sovereignty. When and if this happens, the Soviet Union will no longer suspect that the United Nations is merely an Anglo-American bloc and will willingly entrust her security in the Middle East to the United Nations Organization.

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AN ABSTRACT

The Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus have, since the beginning of history, been the cause of intense rivalries because of their commercial and strategic value, as both the passageway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and as the link between Europe and Asia. From the time of the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 until the 17th century, the Straits were a Turkish lake, closed to outsiders. With the emergence of Russia as a united nation in the 17th century came her first consciousness of the value of the Straits to her. From then on, the history of the Straits is a tale of Russian frustrations in her desire to open the Straits for her warships, through wars with Turkey or diplomatic pressure, by interested Western powers, especially Great Britain.

Russia's inaccessibility to her Allies during the World War because of closure of the Straits made her more anxious than ever to control them herself. With the growth of nationalism in Turkey and the settlement of Russian internal problems, the humiliating and unratified Treaty of Sevres was no longer a satisfactory Straits regime, and the Lausanne Straits Convention was drawn up. It provided for nearly complete freedom of passage for warships in peacetime and wartime, with a limitation on ingress to mollify the Soviet Union, demilitarization of the Straits zone, and the creation of an International Straits Commission.

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In the middle thirties, a series of treaty revisions and modifications were coupled with the obvious ineffectiveness of the League during crises, convinced Turkey that the remilitarization

of the Straits was necessary for her security. In June of 1936, after a formal Turkish note requesting revision sent to the signers of the Lausanne Straits Convention, a conference made up of representatives of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Australia met in Montreux, Switzerland, using as a basis for discussion a draft drawn up by the Turkish government. The final convention was a compromise between this draft and a British one; it was extremely favorable to both Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Straits Commission was eliminated, and its powers given to Turkey. Also, Turkey, when belligerent, could herself decide whether to close the Straits to neutral warships. The Soviet Union was given unlimited egress, except that warships must pass singly, while strict limitations were made on the passage of non-Black Sea warships. All the signatories were well-satisfied, however, even Great Britain, which considered the concessions it made compensated for by Turkish friendship.

During World War II, the Montreux Convention was generally observed by both sides, not, however, from any moral sense but merely circumstanees of the war, for until 1941, the active part of the war did not reach the Straits area. After that, German military control was to great for the Allies to attempt to seize the Straits. In spite of Turkey's treaty of mutual assistance with France and Great Britain, Turkey clung stubbornly to her neutrality until the middle of 1944 when she stopped certain German shipping at British insistence. It was not until

after February 1945 that the Allies were permitted free use of the Straits.

During the last stages of the war, the Soviet Union laid the pattern for her post-war Dardanelles policy by denouncing her peace pact of 1925 with Turkey and demanding strategic bases on the Straits zone itself. At the Potsdam meeting of the Big Three, no agreement on the Straits question could be reached except that each was to communicate separately with Turkey on the matter. The American proposals of November, 1945, accepted by Turkey, favored revision of the Montreux Convention but only of a minor or technical sort. In August, 1946, the Soviet Union presented proposals for sharing control of the Straits with Turkey, only to be met by curt refusals by Britain, the United States, and Turkey. The Soviet government, not so easily discouraged, again requested her share of control in September, at the same time warning Turkey against relying on the help of other great powers. This note, too, was answered by Britain and the United States, which felt that the preliminary steps of separate interchanges with Turkey were definitely closed. The Soviet Union hinted that a new conference for revision would not reach any decision pleasing to her. At the end of 1946, the problem was still unsolved; the Soviet Union, forced into silence momentarily, was still brooding over her frustration, while the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey were equally determined not to permit Turkish sovereignty to be injured.

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The solution of this issue will be difficult, and, at the same time, extremely important. The Straits are one of the danger spots of the world today; if this and other similar problems are not carefully dealt with, they may lead to a third world war. Internationalization would not be welcomed by either the Soviet Union or Turkey, at least not until all other such waterways have been internationalized. Control by the Soviet Union through war or some sort of political compromise about the whole Mediterranean area looks probable. However, if the Soviet Union could be convinced that the Straits are not necessary for her security, either through genuine cooperation among the great powers or by a United Nations having some ruling power, sacrificed to it by the nations of the world, she might relinguish her one of her oldest imperialistic objectives.

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CONVENTION REGARDING THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS

Signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936

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His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominion beyonddthe Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, His Majesty the King of Roumania, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Soviet Republics, and His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia;

Desiring to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term "Straits" in such manner as to safeguard, within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States, the principle enshrined in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923;

Have resolved to replace by the present Convention the Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923,...

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties recognise and affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.

The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regulated

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Article 1

The High Contracting Parties recognise and affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.

The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regulated

by the provisions of the present Convention.

Section 1-Merchant Vessels

Article 2

In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as provided in article 3 below, No taxes or charges other than those authorised by Annex I to the present Convention shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on these vessels when passing in transit without calling at a port in the Straits,

In order to facilate the collection of these taxes or charges merchant vessels passing through the Straits shall communicate to the officials at the stations referred to in article 3 their name, nationality, tonnage, destination and last port of call (provenance).

Pilotage and towage optional.

Article 3

All ships entering the Straits by the Aegean Sea or by the Black Sea shall stop at a sanitary station near the entrance to the Straits for the purposes of the sanitary control prescribed by Turkish law within the framework of international sanitary regulations. This control, in the case of ships possessing a clean bill of health or presenting a declaration of health testifying that they did not fall within the scope of of the provisions of the second paragraph of the present article,

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All ships entering the Straits by the Aegean Sea or by the Black Sea shall stop at a sanitary station near the entrance to the Straits for the purposes of the sanitary control prescribed by Turkish law within the framework of international sanitary regulations. This control, in the case of ships possessing a clean bill of health or presenting a declaration of health testifying that they do not fall within the scope of of the provisions of the second paragraph of the present article,

shall be carried out by night and by day with all possible speed and the vessels in question shall not be required to make any other stop during their passage through the Straits.

Vessels which have on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or smallpox, or which have had such cases on board during the previous seven days, and vessels which hace left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours shall stop at the sanitary stations indicated in the preceding paragraph in order to embark such sanitary guards as the Turkish authorities may direct. No tax or charge shall be levied in respect of these sanitary guards and they shall be disembarked at a sanitary station on departure from the Straits.

Article 4

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, merchant vessels, under any flag or with any kind of cargo, shall enjoy freedon of transit and navigation in the Straits subject to the provisions of articles 2 and 3.

Pilotage and towage remain optional.

Article 5

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, merchant vessels not belonging to a country at war with Turkey shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits on condition that they do not in any way assist the enemy.

Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their transit shall be effected by the route which shall in each case be

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indicated by the Turkish authorities.

Article 6

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, the provisions of article 2 shall nevertheless continue to be applied except that vessels must enter the Straits by day and that their transit must be effected by the route which shall, in each case, be indicated by the Turkish authorities.

Pilotage may, in this case, be made obligatory, but no charge shall be levied,

Article 7

The term "merchant vessels" applies to all vessels which are not covered by Section II of the present Convention,

Section II--Vessels of War

Article 8

For the purposes of the present Convention, the definitions of vessels of war and of their specification together with those relating to the calculation of tonnage shall be as set forth in Annex II to the present Convention.

Article 9

Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid, shall not be subject to the provisions of article 13 regarding notification, nor shall they be counted for the purpose of calculating the tonnage which is subject to limitations under articles 14 and 18, on condition that they shall pass through the Straits singly. They shall,

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Article 9

Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid, shall not be subject to the provisions of article 12 regarding notification, nor shall they be counted for the purpose of calculating the tonnage which is subject to limitations under articles 14 and 18, on condition that they shall pass through the Straits singly. They shall,

however, continue to be on the same footing as vessels of war for the purpose of the remaining provisions governing transit.

The auxiliary vessels specified in the preceding paragraph shall only be entitled to benefit by the exceptional status therein contemplated if their armament does not include : for use against floating targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 105 millimetres; for use against aerial targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 75 millimetres.

Article 10

In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any taxes or charges whatever, provided that such transit is begun during daylight and subject to the conditions laid down in article 13 and the articles following thereafter.

Vessels of war other than those which fall within the categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions provided by articles 11 and 12.

Article 11

Black Sea Powers may send through the Straits capital ships of attonnage greater than that laid down in the first paragraph of article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers,

however, continue to be on the same footing as vessels of war for the purpose of the remaining provisions governing transit.

The auxiliary vessels specified in the preceding paragraph shall only be entitled to benefit by the exceptional status thereinto contemplated if their armament does not include : for use against floating targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 105 millimetres; for use against aerial targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 75 millimetres.

Article 10

In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any taxes or charges whatever, provided that such transit is begun during daylight and subject to the conditions laid down in article 15 and the articles following thereafter.

Vessels of war other than those which fall within the categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions provided by articles 11 and 12.

Article 11

Black Sea Powers may send through the Straits capital ships of aircraft carrier than that laid down in the first paragraph of article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.

Article 12

Black Sea Powers shall have the right to send through the Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their base, submarines constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea, provided that adequate notice of the laying down or purchase of such submarines shall have been given to Turkey.

Submarines belonging to the said Powers shall also be entitled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in dockyards outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed information on the matter is given to Turkey.

In either case, the said submarines must travel by day and on the surface, and must pass through the Straits singly.

Article 13

The transit of vessels of war through the Straits shall be preceded by a notification given to the Turkish Government through the diplomatic channel. The normal period of notice shall be eight days; but is desirable that in the case of non-Black Sea Powers this period should be increased to fifteen days. The notification shall specify the destination, name, type and number of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outward passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any change of date shall be subject to three days' notice.

Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall take place within a period of five days from the date given in the orginal notification. After the expiry of this period, a new

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Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall take place within a period of five days from the date given in the original notification. After the expiry of this period, a new

notification shall be given under the same conditions as for the original notification.

When effecting transit, the commander of the naval force shall, without being under any obligation to stop, communicate to a signal station at the entrance to the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus the exact composition of the force under his orders.

Article 14

The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may in course of transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons, except in the cases provided for in article 11 and in Annex III to the present Convention.

The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall not, however, comprise more than nine vessels.

Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits, in accordance with the provisions of article 17, shall not be included in this tonnage.

Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage during their passage through the Straits be included in this tonnage; such vessels, while undergoing repair, shall be subject to any special provisions relating to security laid down by Turkey.

Article 15

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying.

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Article 15

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying.

Article 16

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall not, except in the event of damage or peril of the sea, remain therein longer than is necessary for them to effect the passage.

Article 17

Nothing in the provisions of the preceding articles shall prevent a naval force of any tonnage or composition from paying a courtesy visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits, at the invitation of the Turkish Government. Any such force must leave the Straits by the same route as that by which it entered, unless it fulfills the conditions required for passage in transit through the Straits as laid down by articles 10, 14, and 18.

Article 18

(1) The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited as follows:-

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shallnnot exceed 30,000 tons;

(b) If

(b) If at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10,000 tons the tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the sate of the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of 30,000 tons mentioned in paragraph (a) shall be increased by the same amount, up to a maximum of 45,000 tons. For this purpose, each Black Sea Power shall, in conformity with Annex IV to the present Con-

vention, inform the Turkish Government, on the 1st January and the 1st July of each year, of the total tonnage of its fleet in the Black Sea; and the Turkish Government shall transmit this informationsto the other High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

(c) The tonnage which any one non-Black Sea Power may have in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above;

(d) In the event, however, of one or more non-Black Sea Powers desiring to send naval forces into the Black Sea, for a humanitarian purpose, the said forces, which shall in no case exceed 8,000 tons altogether, shall be allowed to enter the Black Sea without having to give the notification provided for in article 13 of the present Convention, provided an authorisation is obtained from the Turkish Government in the following circumstances: if the figure of the aggregate tonnage specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) above has not reached and will not be exceeded by the despatch of the forces which it is desired to send, the Turkish Government shall grant the said authorisation within the shortest possible time after receiving the request which has been addressed to it; if the said figure had already been reached or if the despatch of the forces which it is desired to send will cause it to be exceeded, the Turkish Government will immediately inform the other Black Sea Powers of the request for authorisation, and if the said Powers make no objection within twenty-four hours of having received this information, the Turkish

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Government shall, within forty-eight hours at the latest, inform the interested Powers of the reply which its has decided to make to their request.

Any furthur entry into the Black Sea of Naval forces of non-Black Sea Powers shall only be effected within the available limits of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

(2) Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there.

Article 19

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, warships shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation through the Straits under the same conditions as those laid down in Articles 10 to 18.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising out of the application of article 25 of the present Convention, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and registered and published in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of the Covenant.

In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding paragraph, the limitations laid down in articles 10 to 18 of the present Convention shall not be applicable.

Government shall, within forty-eight hours at the latest, inform the interested Powers of the reply which its has decided to make to their request.

Any further entry into the Black Sea of Naval forces of non-Black Sea Powers shall only be effected within the available limits of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

(g) Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there.

Article 19

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, warships shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation through the Straits under the same conditions as those laid down in Articles 10 to 16.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising out of the application of article 25 of the present Convention, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the Leagues of Nations, and registered and published in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of the Covenant.

In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding paragraph, the limitations laid down in articles 10 to 18 of the present Convention shall not be applicable.

Notwithstanding the Prohibition of passage laid down in Paragraph 2 above, vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers whether they are Black Sea Powers or not, which have become separated from their bases, may return thereto.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not make any capture, exercise the right of visit and search, or carry out any hostile act in the Straits.

Article 20

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, the provisions of article 10 to 18 shall not be applicable; the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.

Article 21

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war she shall have the right to apply the provisions of article 20 of the present Convention.

Vessels which have passed through the Straits before Turkey has made use of the powers conferred upon her by the preceding paragraph, and which thus find themselves separated from their bases may return thereto. It is, however, understood that Turkey may deny this right to vessels of war belonging to the State whose attitude has given rise to the application of the present article.

Should the Turkish Government make use of the powers conferred by the first paragraph of the present article, a notification to that effect shall be addressed to the High Contracting

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Should the Turkish Government make use of the powers conferred by the first paragraph of the present article, a notification to that effect shall be addressed to the High Contracting

Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

If the Council of the League of Nations shall decide by a majority of two-thirds that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justified, and if such should also be the opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties signatories to the Present Convention, the Turkish Government undertakes to discontinue the measures in question as also any measures which may have been taken been taken under article 6 of the present Convention.

Article 22

Vessels of war which have on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or smallpox or which have had such cases on board within the last seven days and vessels of war which have left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours must pass through the Straits in quarantine and apply by the means on board such prophylactic measures as are necessary on order to prevent any possibility of the Straits being infected.

Section III Aircraft

Article 23

In order to assure the passage of civil aircraft between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish Government will indicate the air routes available for this purpose, outside the forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits. Civil aircraft may use these routes provided that they give the Turkish Government, as regards occasional flights, a notification-

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of three days, and as regards flights on regular services, a general notification of the dates of passage.

The Turkish Government moreover undertake, notwithstanding any remilitarisation of the Straits, to furnish the necessary facilities for the safe passage of civil aircraft authorised under the air regulations in force on Turkey to fly across Turkish territory between Europe and Asia. The route which is to be followed in the Straits zone by aircraft which have obtained an authorisation shall be indicated from time to time.

Section IV General Provisions

Article 24

The functions of the International Commission set up under the Convention relating to the regime of the Straits of the 24th July, 1923, are hereby transferred to the Turkish Government.

The Turkish Government undertake to collect statistics and to furnish information concerning the application of articles 11, 12, 14, and 18 of the present Convention.

They will supervise the execution of all the provisions of the present Convention relating to the passage of vessels of war through the Straits.

As soon as they have been notified of the intended passage through the Straits of a foreign naval force the Turkish Government shall inform the representatives at Angora of the High Contracting Parties of the composition of that force, its tonnage, the date fixed for its entry into the Straits, and, if necessary,

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the probable date of its return.

The Turkish Government shall address to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and to the High Contracting Parties an annual report giving details regarding the movement of foreign vessels of war through the Straits and furnishing all information which may be of service to commerce and navigation, both by sea and by air, for which provision is made in the present Convention.

Article 25

Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any of the other High Contracting Parties members of the League of Nations.

Section V Final Provisions

Article 26

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic in Paris.

The Japanese Government shall be entitled to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic repre- in Paris that the ratification has been given, and in that case they shall transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A <u>procès-verbal</u> of the deposit of ratifications shall be drawn up as soon as six instruments of ratification, including that of Turkey, shall have been deposited. For this purpose the notification provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be taken as the equivalent of the deposit of an instrument of rati-

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The present Convention shall come into force on the date of the said procès-verbal.

The French Government will transmit to all the High Contracting Parties an authentic copy of the procès-verbal provided for in the preceding paragraph and of the procès-verbaux of the deposit of any subsequent ratifications.

Article 27

The present Convention shall, as from the date of its entry into force, be open to accession by any Power signatory to the Treaty of Peace at Lausanne signed on the 24th July, 1923.

Each accession shall be notified, through the diplomatic channel, to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all the High Contracting Parties.

Accessions shall come into force as from the date of notifications to the French Government.

Article 28

The present Convention shall remain in force for twenty years from the date of its entry into force.

The principle of freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in article 1 of the present Convention shall however continue without limit of time.

If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have given notice of denunciation to the French Government the present Convention

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The present Convention shall come into force on the date of the said procès-verbal.

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shall however continue in force until two years after such notice shall have been given. Any such notice shall be communicated by the French Government to the High Contracting Parties.

In the event of the present Convention being denounced in accordance with the provisions of the present article, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference for the purpose of concluding a new Convention.

Article 29

At the expiry of each period of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions of the present Convention.

To be valid, any request for revision formulated by one of the High Contracting Parties must be supported, in the case of modifications to articles 14 or 18, by one other High Contracting Party, and, in the case of modifications to any other article, by two other High Contracting Parties.

Any request for revision thus supported must be notified to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to the expiry of the current period of five years. This notification shall contain details of the proposed amendments and the reasons which have given rise to them.

Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High Con-

shall however continue in force until two years after such notice shall have been given. Any such notice shall be communicated by the French Government to the High Contracting Parties.

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Any request for revision thus supported must be notified to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to the expiry of the current period of five years. This notification shall contain details of the proposed amendments and the reasons which have given rise to them.

Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High Con-

tracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference to be summoned for this purpose.

Such a conference may only take decisions by a unanimous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving articles 14 and 18, for which a majority of three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.

The said majority shall include three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turkey.

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